Bargaining Over Loyalty by Crane, Daniel A.
University of Michigan Law School 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository 
Law & Economics Working Papers 
2-1-2013 
Bargaining Over Loyalty 
Daniel A. Crane 
University of Michigan Law School, dancrane@umich.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current 
 Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, and the Law and Economics Commons 
Working Paper Citation 
Crane, Daniel A., "Bargaining Over Loyalty" (2013). Law & Economics Working Papers. 72. 
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/72 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law & Economics Working Papers by an authorized administrator 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
CRANE 2/25/2013 9:14 AM 
 
 
1 
 
 
Bargaining Over Loyalty 
 
 
 
Daniel A. Crane* 
 
Abstract 
 
 
Contracts between suppliers and customers frequently contain 
provisions rewarding the customer for exhibiting loyalty to the seller.  
For example, suppliers may offer customers preferential pricing for 
buying a specified percentage of their requirements from the supplier 
or buying minimum numbers of products across multiple product 
lines.  Such loyalty-inducing contracts have come under attack on 
antitrust grounds because of their potential to foreclose competitors 
or soften competition by enabling tacit collusion among suppliers.  
This article defends loyalty inducement as a commercial practice.  
Although it can be anticompetitive under some circumstances, 
rewarding loyal customers is usually procompetitive and price-
reducing.  The two most severe attacks on loyalty discounting—that 
loyalty discounts are often disguised disloyalty penalties and that 
loyalty clauses soften competition—are unlikely to hold as a general 
matter.  Nor are arguments that customers only accede to loyalty 
inducements because of collective action problems generally true.  
Dominant buyers who face few collective action problems frequently 
use loyalty commitments to leverage their buying power and obtain 
lower prices.   
 
1
Crane:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2013
92 TEX. L. REV. ___ (2013)  
2013] Bargaining Over Loyalty 2 
 
 2 
 
Bargaining Over Loyalty 
 
 
 
Daniel A. Crane* 
 
“These kinds of agreements allow firms to reward their most loyal 
customers. Rewarding customer loyalty promotes competition on the 
merits.” 
 
 Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd. v. British Airways PLC, 257 F.3d 256, 
265 (2d Cir. 2001) 
 
 
Loyalty has an unambiguously positive connotation in ordinary 
discourse and in most legal fields.
1
  For example, ethical canons 
require attorneys to remain faithful to their clients;
2
 trustees and 
board members owe fiduciary duties to beneficiaries and 
shareholders;
3
 spouses enjoy testimonial privileges based on social 
conventions respecting marital loyalty;
4
 adultery remains 
criminalized in most states and a felony in some;
5
 democratic theory 
requires judges to remain faithful to the will of the people expressed 
                                                          
*  Professor of Law, University of Michigan.  Caroline Flynn provided excellent 
research assistance. 
1
 See generally ERIC FELTEN, LOYALTY:  THE VEXING VIRTUE (2011) (examining 
the virtue of loyalty in historical and contextual perspective). 
2
 Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 5 (specifying requirements of lawyer 
loyalty to client). 
3
 See, e.g., Randy J. Holland, Delaware Directors’ Fiduciary Duties:  The Focus 
on Loyalty, 11 U. Pa. J. Bus. L. 675 (2009). 
4
 See 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §  2333 (McNaughten rev. 1961). 
5
 See Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 272, § 14, ch. 274, § 1; Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. 
§750.30. 
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in constitutions or statutes;
6
 and the law metes out far greater harsher 
punishment on the traitor than the common enemy.
7
  George Fletcher 
has observed that “[s]ome of the strongest moral epithets in the 
English language are reserved for the weak who cannot meet the 
threshold of loyalty: They commit adultery, betrayal, treason.”8 
 Reflecting venomous disapprobation of treachery, Dante placed the 
traitors Brutus, Cassius, and Judas Iscariot in Lucifer’s jaws in Hell’s 
ninth circle.
9
 In most contexts, loyalty only becomes difficult 
ethically and morally when loyalty obligations collide—when loyalty 
to one person means disloyalty to another.
10
 
Antitrust law is exceptional—loyalty receives a far less congenial 
welcome.  Antitrust values rivalry between competing sellers, which 
implies an opportunity to steal business from the rival.  Customer 
loyalty obstructs this hydraulic action. Particularly troubling are 
inducements to loyalty offered by firms with market power.  When 
dominant sellers offer customers incentives to remain loyal to the 
seller, these loyalty incentives may stifle competition and harm the 
very customers offered the ostensibly favorable terms.  Even if the 
customer understands the loyalty incentive’s exclusionary or 
collusive potential, she may find it to be in her economic interest to 
accept the incentive since other customers will be accepting it 
regardless of her decision.  Dominant firms may require their 
customers to remain loyal for the purpose of starving rivals of sales 
opportunities, thus ensuring that in the long run there are no other 
sellers to tempt customers into disloyalty.  Or, they may use loyalty 
incentives to facilitate supracompetitive oligopolistic pricing. 
Loyalty or fidelity incentives have recently been challenged 
under the antitrust laws in the United States and the European Union.  
For example, parallel cases in the U.S. and EU against British 
Airways and Intel challenged those dominant firms’ practices of 
incentivizing customers—travel agents or computer manufacturers—
to remain loyal to British Airways or Intel at the expense of smaller 
                                                          
6
 See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings:  Fidelity and 
Theory, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 395 (1995). 
7
 See George P. Fletcher, The Case for Treason, 41 Md. L. Rev. 193 (1982) 
(PAREN). 
8
 GEORGE P. FLETCHER, LOYALTY:  AN ESSAY ON THE MORALITY OF 
RELATIONSHIPS 8 (1993). 
9
  DANTE ALIGHIERI, INFERNO, Canto 34, ll. 64-68, at 537 (Robert M. Durling ed. 
& trans., 1996). 
10
 See Felten, supra n. xxx (examining moral dilemmas raised by conflicts of  
loyalty). 
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rivals, Virgin Atlantic and AMD.
11
  Scores of other cases challenging 
loyalty discounts, rebates, or other incentives have been filed on both 
sides of the Atlantic, particularly in private lawsuits in the U.S.
12
  An 
extensive academic literature assesses the ways in which loyalty 
incentives can exclude competitors or soften competition.
13
 
                                                          
11
 Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd. v. British Airways PLC, 257 F.3d 256 (2d. Cir. 
2001) (rejecting Virgin Atlantic’s challenge to British Airways’ loyalty incentives 
to travel agents); In re Intel Corp., Administrative Complaint, FTC Docket # 934 
(Dec. 16, 2009), http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9341/091216intelcmpt.pdf 
(challenging Intel’s market share rebates to original equipment manufacturers); 
Summary of Commission Decision of 13 May 2009 Relating to a Proceeding 
Under Article 82 of the EC Treaty and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement 
(COMP/C-3/37.990—Intel), 2009 O.J. (C 227) (finding Intel’s market share 
rebates to original equipment manufacturers incompatible with Articles 101 and 
102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Euopean Union and fining Intel €1.06 
billion); Case C-95/04 P, British Airways Plc v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. I-2331 
(finding British Airways . . . ). 
12
 See infra text accompanying notes xxx – xxx.  
13
 The literature on the potential anticompetitive effects of loyalty discounts 
includes Einer Elhauge & Abraham L. Wickelgren, Anti-competitive Exclusion and 
Market Division Through Loyalty Discounts, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1937658;  Einer Elhauge & 
Abraham L. Wickelgren, Robust Exclusion Through Loyalty Discounts, John M. 
Olin Center for Law, Economics & Business Discussion Paper No. 662 (Jan. 
2010); Leslie M. Marx & Greg Shaffer, Rent Shifting, Exclusion, and Market-Share 
Discounts, http://www.simon.rochester.edu/fac/shaffer/Published/rentshift.pdf; 
Jonathan M. Jacobson,  A Note on Loyalty Discounts, 9-JUN Antitrust Source 1 
(2010); Einer Elhauge, How Loyalty Discounts Can Perversely Discourage 
Discounting, 5 J. Comp. L. & Econ. 189 (2009); David E. Mills, Inducing 
Downstream Selling Effort with Market Share Discounts, 
http://www.virginia.edu/economics/Workshops/papers/mills/Market%20Share%20
Discounts.pdf;  Richard A. Duncan &  Brian S. McCormac, Loyalty & Fidelity 
Discounts and Rebates in the U.S. & E.U.:  Will Divergence Occur Over Cost-
Based Standards of Liability, 9 Sedona Conf. J. 133 (2008); Gianluca Faella, The 
Antitrust Assessment of Loyalty Discounts and Rebates, 4 J. Comp. L. & Econ. 375 
(2008); Benjamin Klein & Andres V. Lerner, The Expanded  Economics of Free-
Riding: How Exclusive Dealing Prevents Free-Riding and Creates Undivided 
Loyalty, 74 Antitrust L. J. 473 (2007); Janusz Ordover & Greg Shaffer, 
Exclusionary Discounts, (CCP Working Paper No. 07-13, 2007); Louis Kaplow & 
Carl Shapiro, Antitrust, in 2 Handbook of Law & Economics 1073 (2007);  David 
Spector, Loyalty Rebates:  An Assessment of Competition Concerns and a 
Proposed Structured Rule of Reason, 1 Comp. Pol’y Int’l  89 (2005); Joseph 
Farrell, Deconstructing Chicago on Exclusive Dealing, 50 Antitrust Bulletin 465 
(2005); Bruce Kobayashi, The Economics of Loyalty Discounts and Antitrust Law 
in the United States, 1 Comp. Policy Int. 115 (2005); Patrick Greenlee & David 
Reitman, Competing with Loyalty Discounts, (EAG Discussion Paper 04-2, 2004); 
4
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Although loyalty incentives can harm competition, they also can 
enhance consumer welfare by driving down prices and facilitating 
more efficient exchange between buyers and sellers. One strand 
missing in the current literature—which largely focuses on the 
deployment of loyalty incentives by dominant sellers—is the extent 
to which customers play a strong role in proposing and propagating 
the use of loyalty incentives.  Customers willingly exchange loyalty 
commitments for lower prices.  This phenomenon cannot simply be 
dismissed as the product of customer collective action problems.  
Monopsony or oligopsony buyers who face few collective action 
problems frequently use loyalty discounts to drive prices down.  The 
federal government, perhaps the world’s most powerful buyer, 
frequently uses loyalty incentives to drive down its acquisition costs.  
Collective purchasing societies such as hospital Group Purchasing 
Organizations, Pharmacy Benefit Managers, and buyer cooperatives, 
which are formed in large part to solve collective action problems, 
often push for loyalty discounts or rebates as part of their strategy to 
lower their member prices.
14
 Academic marketing literature describes 
loyalty as a bargaining chip that can be beneficially exploited by both 
strong and weak buyers.
15
 
This Article contributes to the ongoing legal and economic 
discussion over loyalty discounts in three ways.  First, in Part I, it 
situates the conversation over loyalty discounts within the broader 
conversation over exclusionary practices and law’s response.  In 
particular, Part I distinguishes loyalty discounts from volume 
discounts, introduces current legal treatment of loyalty discounts in 
the United States and European Union, and discusses the way that 
U.S. antitrust law on loyalty discounts is likely to evolve in light of 
recent precedent—not primarily by the development of new legal 
rules but by the expression of judicial maxims such as the quotation 
from the Virgin Atlantic decision at the beginning of this Article. 
This Article’s second major contribution is to answer two 
developing criticisms of loyalty discounts that have the potential to 
turn into anti-loyalty judicial maxims.  The first of these is that 
                                                                                                                                      
Willard K. Tom, David A. Balto & Neil W. Averitt, Anticompetitive Aspects of 
Market-Share Discounts and Other Incentives to Exclusive Dealing, 67 Antitrust L. 
J. 615 (2000); Ilya R. Segal & Michael Whinston, Naked Exclusion:  Comment, 90 
Am. Econ. Rev. 296 (2000); Eric B. Rasmusen, J. Mark Ramseyer & John S. 
Wiley, Naked Exclusion, 81 Am. Econ. Rev.  296 (1991). 
14
 See infra text accompanying notes xxx – xxx. 
15
 See infra text accompanying notes xxx – xxx. 
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loyalty discounts need not be—and often are not—true discounts, but 
rather disloyalty penalties.  This claim is economically implausible, 
since it would have the seller giving the buyer a choice of accepting 
either a price above the profit-maximizing monopoly level or else an 
onerous contractual term above the profit-maximizing monopoly 
level.  Either scenario would effectively cause the monopolist to 
exceed the profit-maximizing monopoly price and hence be 
unprofitable.  The second criticism of loyalty discounts is that they 
soften competition between sellers—essentially that they facilitate 
supracompetitive seller pricing even without excluding any seller 
from the market.  Part II shows that the assumptions underlying this 
claim are restrictive and not generalizable and that counterevidence 
suggests that if loyalty discounts are anticompetitive, it is only 
because they are sometimes exclusionary. 
This Article’s final major contribution, made in Part III, is to 
reorient the conversation away from an assumption that loyalty 
incentives are seller-initiated strategies.  Rather, the available 
evidence suggests that loyalty incentives are often bargaining chips 
in negotiations between sellers and buyers—invoked by customers as 
often as suppliers in return for other concessions.  Thinking about 
loyalty incentives as bargaining chips does not dispel the possibility 
that such provisions can have exclusionary effects, but it does 
suggest that courts should be cautious about discouraging the use of 
loyalty incentives, which may take away a chip that buyers could 
otherwise invoke to improve their position. 
I. FOUNDATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
A.  Loyalty and Volume 
 
Loyalty provisions come in a variety of forms.  The strongest 
form is a pure exclusive dealing agreement in which the buyer 
promises to buy all of its requirements from the supplier and not to 
purchase from any other supplier.
16
 Short of this, contracts 
sometimes contain partial exclusive dealing clauses that commit the 
buyer to make a specified level or percentage of its purchases from 
                                                          
16
 See generally 11 PHILLIP E.  AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 
¶ 1821 (3d ed. 2011). 
6
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 7 
the seller.
17
  Often sellers seek to induce loyalty rather than to require 
it.  Loyalty inducement provisions also take a good many forms, but 
their common denominator is an option on the buyer’s part to secure 
a better price by demonstrating greater loyalty.  Two common forms 
are market share discounts and bundled discounts.  
Bundled discounts offer a buyer a better price for purchasing 
minimum amounts of the seller’s product across two more separate 
product lines.
18
  For example, in one of the leading recent bundled 
discount cases, the conglomerate manufacturer 3M offered retailers 
rebates that were conditioned the retailer making minimum purchases 
on six of 3M’s product lines including Health Care Products, Home 
Care Products, Home Improvement Products, Stationery Products, 
Retail Auto Products, and Leisure Time.
19
  Unlike a single-product 
volume discount, the customer can only achieve bundled discounts or 
rebates by demonstrating loyalty in a number of separate buckets of 
purchases. 
Although bundled discounts partake of many of the attributes of 
single-product loyalty discounts, they add significant complexities.  
Bundled discounts create different kinds of exclusionary effects—
particularly the potential to exclude rivals that do not sell the 
dominant firm’s full product line.20  They also may exhibit different 
sorts of efficiencies or procompetitive justifications—such as the 
potential to eliminate double marginalization—21 that would not 
generally be true of single-product loyalty discounts.
22
  Further, 
                                                          
17
 Tom, et al, supra n. xxx at 622-627 (discussing anticompetitive effects arising 
from partial exclusive dealing);  
18
 Daniel A. Crane, Mixed Bundling, Profit Sacrifice, and Consumer Welfare, 55 
Emory L. J. 423 (2006) (analyzing economics of bundled discounting); Elhauge, 
Tying, Bundled Discounts, supra n. xxx (discussing exclusionary potential of 
bundled discounts); Thomas A. Lambert, Appropriate Liability Rules for Tying and 
Bundled Discounting, 72 Ohio State L. J. 909 (2011); Herbert Hovenkamp, 
Complex Bundled Discounts and Antitrust Policy, 57 Buff. L. Rev. 1227 (2009). 
19
 LePage’s, Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 154 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc). 
20
 See Crane, Mixed Bundling, supra n. xxx at 443-47 (exploring exclusionary 
potential of bundled discounts). 
21
 Id. at 434-36; Erik Hovenkamp & Herbert Hovenkamp, Tying Arrangements and 
Antitrust Harm, 52 Ariz. L. Rev. 925 (2010). 
22
 But see Sreya Kolay, Greg Shaffer & Janusz Ordover, “All-Units Discounts in 
Retail Contracts,” 13 Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 429 (2004) 
7
Crane:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2013
92 TEX. L. REV. ___ (2013)  
2013] Bargaining Over Loyalty 8 
 
 8 
bundled discounts raise unique theoretical questions about the 
plausibility of a dominant firm’s exclusionary strategy—such as 
whether it would be rational for a firm to use a bundled discount to 
leverage market power in one market to obtain a monopoly in a 
second market in light of the fact that raising the price in the second 
market might reduce sales in the first market if the two goods are 
complements.
23
  Because of these significant distinctions, bundled 
discounts merit separate consideration from single-product market 
share or other loyalty discounts and are beyond the scope of this 
Article. 
Market share discounts are the paradigmatic single-product 
loyalty incentive.  They operate by granting the buyer a better price if 
it purchases specified percentages of its requirements from the 
seller.
24
  Market share discounts are sometime graduated—for 
                                                                                                                                      
(discussing potential of even single-product market share discounts to eliminate 
double marginalization). 
23
 See Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, supra n. xxx at 403-19.  The Chicago 
School of economic analysis argued that it would be irrational for a firm with a 
monopoly in market A to attempt to leverage its power into a complementary 
market B, since increasing the price of one product leads to a diminution in the 
demand for its complements.  Hence, by leveraging monopoly power and 
attempting to extract a second monopoly profit, the dominant firm would simply be 
cannibalizing its own profits in the leveraging market.  See ROBERT A. BORK, THE 
ANTITRUST PARADOX 372-75, 380-81 (1978); RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST 
LAW 197-99 (2d ed. 2001); Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the 
Leverage Problem, 67 Yale L.J. 19, 20-23 (1957); Aaron Director & Edward H. 
Levi, Law and the Future: Trade Regulation, 51 Nw. U. L. Rev. 281, 290-92 
(1956).  Elhauge argues that the one monopoly profit theory overlooked a number 
of ways in which leverage could be profitable. 
24
 Herbert Hovenkamp, The Obama Administration and Section 2 of the Sherman 
Act, 90 B.U. L. Rev. 1611, 1649-50 (2010) (explaining distinctions between 
quantity and market share discounts).  A variation on a market share requirement is 
a retail shelf  placement requirement.  In Church & Dwight Co. v. Mayer Labs., 
Inc., ___ F. Supp. 2d ___ (N.D Cal. 2012), for example, a condom manufacturer 
granted retailers different levels of rebates for maintaining its products in various 
percentages of the retailer’s shelf-space dedicated to condoms, for example a 55% 
tier (awarding a 4.0% rebate for 55% or more of a retail chain's display space), a 
65% tier (awarding a 7% rebate for 65% or more of the display space), and a 70% 
tier (awarding a 7.5% rebate for 70% or more of the display space. 
8
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example, a buyer receives a 5% discount for purchasing 60% or more 
of its requirements from the seller, a 7% discount for purchasing 75% 
or more, and a 9% discount for purchasing 90% or more.  Also, 
market share discounts may apply only to incremental dollars (i.e., to 
all purchases above 60%) or retroactively to the first dollar.
25
  A 
loyalty discount can be given instantaneously at the point of sale or 
rebated at some later time, such as at year’s end. 
How loyalty discounts are structured is often significant in 
determining whether they can have exclusionary effects.  For 
example, first-dollar rebates are usually considered more problematic 
than incremental dollar discounts, since smaller rivals of the seller 
have to compete against price concessions given across a far greater 
swath of sales.
26
  Contracts with claw-back features, where the seller 
grants the buyer a favorable price on the assumption that it will meet 
a loyalty threshold subject to a repayment obligation in the event the 
buyer does not meet the threshold, may create particular antitrust 
risks insofar as buyers may be loath to run the risk of incurring large 
lump-sum penalties at year’s end and hence remain strictly loyal to 
the seller.
27
  
                                                          
25
 See Jonathan M. Jacobson, A Note on Loyalty Discounts, 9-JUN Antitrust Source 
1, 1-2 (2010) (explaining first-dollar discounts); Duncan, supra n. xxx at 134 
(explaining distinctions between first-dollar and incremental dollar discounts). 
26
 Jonathan M. Jacobson, Towards a Consistent Antitrust Treatment for Unilateral 
Conduct, 8-FEB Antitrust Source 1, 6 (2009) (explaining that “first dollar discounts 
may provide especially strong inducements--in some instances, outright coercion--
because they apply not only to the contested volume but to all of the customer's 
purchases, enhancing a loss if the percentage commitment is not fulfilled”); Robert 
H. Lande, Should Predatory Pricing Rules Immunize Exclusionary Discounts, 2006 
Utah L. Rev. 863, 864 (2006) (“Unlike ‘regular’ discounts, which are almost 
always procompetitive, retroactive discounts have a strong exclusionary and 
anticompetitive potential.”). 
27
 See Jonathan M. Jacobson, Towards a Consistent Antitrust Policy for Unilateral 
Conduct, 8-FEB Antitrust Source 1, 6 (2009) (“Some such discounts, called “first 
dollar” discounts, may provide especially strong inducements--in some instances, 
outright coercion--because they apply not only to the contested volume but to all of 
the customer's purchases, enhancing a loss if the percentage commitment is not 
fulfilled.”).  Allegations about claw-back provisions have been at issue in some 
recent loyalty discount cases.  See Southeast Missouri Hosp. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 642 
F.3d 608, 617 (8
th
 Cir. 2011). 
9
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One of the frequently discussed questions with respect to market 
share discounts is why a seller who wants to reward high-volume 
customers should not simply offer a traditional volume discount.
28
  
Before getting to some of the answers, it is worth noting that 
sometimes volume and loyalty discounting is substantively 
equivalent.  Volume discounts and loyalty discounts can be identical 
in operation.  Suppose, for example, that the buyer has a stable need 
for 100 tons of salt per year.  If the seller offers the buyer a 5% price 
reduction for buying 80 tons of salt or 80% of its salt requirements 
per year, the effect on the buyer’s incentives will be identical 
assuming its buying needs stay constant.
29
  
On the other hand, market share discounts often differ from 
volume discounts in significant ways.  In several circumstances, 
market share discounts may be more advantageous to the buyer than 
volume discounts. 
First, market share discounts have the effect of shifting risks of 
changing market circumstances from buyers to sellers in ways that 
volume discounts do not.
30
  For example, Herbert Hovenkamp has 
                                                          
28
 See, e.g., Evaluating the Competitive Effects of Exclusive Dealing Agreements, 
An ABA Section of Antitrust Law and ABA Center for Continuing Legal 
Education Telesminar, in Cooperation with the Antitrust Section of the Houston 
Bar Association (Houston, Texas June 24, 2005), 5-NOV Antitrust Source 1, 6 
(2005) ([W]hy reward your best customers with a “loyalty” discount? Why not do 
it instead through a less restrictive alternative like a volume discount?”) (comments 
of Joe Grinstein).  On the distinction between market share and loyalty discounts, 
see ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 265 n. 6 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing 
Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 768, at 169 (3d ed. 
2008)). 
29
 A case in point is then-Judge Breyer’s decision in Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT 
Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227 (lst Cir. 1983), which involved the  market for 
snubbers, safety devices used in nuclear power plants.  The defendant then offered 
a major customer a large discount if it would agree to purchase large quantities of 
snubbers, amounting to a large share of its expected purchases, over a two-year 
period.  Since the customer’s snubber needs were stable and predictable, it 
probably would have made little difference if the supplier made the discount 
contingent on loyalty or volume. 
30
 Herbert Hovenkamp, The Federal Trade Commission and the Sherman Act, 62 
Fla. L. Rev. 871, 889 (2010) (explaining that a seller like Intel uses market share 
discounts rather than volume discounts in order to shift the costs of market 
10
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explained Intel’s market share discounts as a means of shifting the 
risk of a weakening market from original equipment manufacturers 
like Dell and HP to Intel.
31
  If the computer market weakens more 
than expected, Dell and HP might not be able to meet a contractually 
specified volume threshold and hence might lose a volume-based 
discount.  However, if to obtain Intel’s lowest price they must just 
buy a specified percentage of their central processing unit needs from 
Intel—say 80%—they can continue to claim the best price even in a 
weak computer market. 
Second, and in a same vein, market share discounts may be used 
to guarantee the supplier a minimum volume of sales when the 
requirements of a group of customers are unpredictable.
32
  To stay 
with the computer industry, suppose that Intel will be able to 
optimize its planning and achieve economies of scale if it knows that 
it will sell at least one million CPUs in the coming year.  Although it 
makes a fairly strong prediction that the total volume of CPU sales in 
the market will be around two million, the OEMs are engaged in a 
fierce market share battle of their own and the CPU requirements of 
any individual OEM are hard to determine given the vagaries of the 
market.  Intel may identify a group of OEMs that are likely to 
purchase around 1.25 million collectively, although the distribution 
of purchases within the group is uncertain.  If each of the OEMs in 
this group agrees to purchase 80% of its requirements from Intel, 
Intel can count on making a million CPU sales in the coming year 
from this group of customers.  From Intel’s perspective, it is 
beneficial to offer a discount in exchange for a market share 
commitment so that Intel can plan on the level of sales it will make in 
the coming year and perhaps optimize its production facilities.  From 
the OEM’s perspective, the deal is also beneficial.  The OEMs secure 
                                                                                                                                      
downturns from its customers to itself:  “A quantity discount attaches to a specified 
number of chips, and if the market becomes weak and the computer maker's sales 
fall below that number, the computer maker must pay the higher price. By contrast, 
the market share discount attaches to, say, 90% of the buyer's sales, whatever they 
happen to be. So the market share discount offers the computer maker the lower 
price, even if the market becomes weak, provided that the computer maker 
purchases its requisite percentage of chips from the seller.”). 
31
 Id. 
32
 C.f. Jacobson, supra n. xxx at 3 (“A supplier can offer volume discounts or other 
price concessions, without loyalty commitments, to generate volume to account for 
high fixed costs.”). 
11
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a more favorable price and one that does not require them to commit 
to a volume of purchases they may be unable to meet.
33
 
Third, market share discounts may enable even relatively small 
buyers who might not qualify for a volume discount to enhance their 
bargaining position with suppliers and exact pricing concessions.  
This occurs because the buyer is able to exchange its freedom to 
pursue variety in its purchases for a lower price.  By foregoing its 
variety preferences and focusing on a single seller, the buyer 
effectively elasticizes the demand facing the seller and hence can 
obtain a better price.
34
  Developing this model, Ben Klein and Kevin 
Murphy consider the example of packaged food manufacturers 
competing for retail shelf space.
35
  Each manufacturer would like to 
secure the most shelf space possible for its products.  Retailers are 
much less interested than the manufacturer as to which brand of 
spices gets precedence on their shelves.  They are competing against 
other manufacturers to create the optimal basket of product selection, 
price, and service.
36
  The retailer essentially acts as a bargaining 
agent for the interests of its customers, trading off different 
characteristics.  When the retailer commits to partial or exclusive 
shelf-space loyalty to a particular brand, it will disappoint some 
customers who would prefer access to a different brand.
37
  But, by 
foregoing customer’s variety preferences, the retailer elasticizes the 
demand facing the manufacturer.
38
  This, in turn, allows the retailer 
to obtain better wholesale prices and pass them along to customers as 
better retail prices.
39
  Although it entails some loss of consumer 
surplus—the customers who had strong variety preferences—the 
aggregate consumer welfare effects due to the lower prices can be 
significantly positive.
40
  Significantly, Klein and Murphy’s model 
                                                          
33
 This effect could be realized even  if the buyers do not commit ex ante to 
purchase 80% of their requirements from the seller but the seller expects that the 
offer of discount if they do will incentivize them purchase the 80% share.  
Commitment is just a strong form of expectation. 
34
 Benjamin Klein & Kevin M. Murphy, Exclusive Dealing Intensifies Competition 
for Distribution, 75 Antitrust L.J. 433, 437-65 (2008). 
35
 Id. 
36
 Id. at 443. 
37
 Id. at 451. 
38
 Id. 
39
 Id. 
40
 Id. 
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shows how even relatively small purchasers with little buying power 
can deploy loyalty to secure better prices.
41
  
Loyal behavior by buyers can have similar properties to the 
preferred shelf space commitments discussed by Klein and Murphy.  
Imagine a small, regional hospital that needs to purchase catheters.   
Assume that there are four major catheter suppliers, and that 
catheters are somewhat differentiated products.  The nurses and other 
medical professionals who administer catheters have idiosyncratic 
preferences for different brands.  If each hospital ward or unit makes 
its own purchasing decision, the hospital will end up using all four 
brands.  Suppose, however, that hospital procurement administrators 
decide to cut costs by centralizing the hospital’s purchasing 
decisions.  One effect of this is to increase the volume the hospital 
can use as leverage in any purchasing negotiation.  But even 
consolidating all of the hospital’s buying power may not secure the 
hospital much leverage.  By committing to loyalty—for example 
deciding to buy 85% of its catheter requirements from a single 
manufacturer—the hospital elasticizes the demand facing the 
manufacturers.  Nurses may no longer have as easy access to their 
preferred brand of catheter, but the overall effect on composite 
patient pricing and quality may be positive.   
An obvious objection to this and the shelf space illustrations is 
that loyalty discounts secure lower prices at the expense of 
individuals with idiosyncratic needs or preferences—the gourmet 
cook who highly valued a particular brand of spice or the neonatal 
unit nurse who believes that a particular brand of catheter is optimal 
                                                          
41
 Id. at 459 (noting that “significantly lower wholesale prices can be achieved by 
retailers with relatively small market shares as long as the retailer has the ability to 
influence the share of its customers' purchases in a product category that is 
obtained by a chosen manufacturer”).  At least one federal court has recognized this 
benefit of market share discounts, without exploring the economic rationale.  See 
Smith Wholesale Co. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 477 F.3d 854, 864-65  (6
th
 Cir. 
2007) (“Market share discounts theoretically level the playing field by allowing 
competing purchasers of like commodities to participate on equal terms, regardless 
of size, because such discounts depend not on volume purchases, but on the 
percentage of purchases of a particular category of products.”); see also Donald 
Hawthorne & Margaret Sanderson, Rigorous Analysis of Economic Evidence on 
Class Certification in Antitrust Cases, 24-FALL Antitrust 55, 59 (2009) (reporting 
that Tyco’s market share discounts for pulse oximeters allowed small hospitals to 
achieve lower prices than they could under pure volume discounts). 
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for her patients’ needs.  Part of the answer—already told—is that 
many purchasing decisions made by intermediaries or agents on 
behalf of others necessarily involve trade-offs between price, variety, 
quality, and convenience.  The other part of the answer is that the use 
of commercial loyalty devices need not result in complete 
homogenization of the available product offering.  As already 
discussed—and discussed further below—market share discounts are 
often partial, providing for the purchase by the buyer of a large 
portion, but not all, of its requirements.
42
  One of the reasons that 
many loyalty discounts are set at 80 or 85% is to allow some room 
for the buyer agent or intermediary to honor the variety preferences 
of the most variety-preferring principals (such as nurses or grocery 
shoppers).  Of course, committing a lower percentage in order to 
preserve the preferences of the principals with the most inelastic 
demand diminishes the elasticizing effect of committing to loyalty.  
But it is these kinds of trade-off decisions that intermediaries and 
agents routinely make. 
 
B.  Current Legal Treatment 
 
Single-product loyalty inducements have been recently 
challenged in both the United States and the European Union as 
exclusionary or otherwise anticompetitive devices.  In the United 
States, they have been principally challenged as restraints of trade 
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act,
43
 monopolizing devices in 
violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act,
44
 exclusive dealing 
agreements under Section 3 of the Clayton Act,
45
 price discrimination 
in violation of the Robinson-Patman Act,
46
 or violations of Section 5 
of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
47
  In the European Union, they 
have been challenged as abridgements of Article 101 on the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”), which 
prohibits restrictive agreements and Article 102 which prohibits 
abuse of a dominant position.  This Article will not discuss the 
potential differences between these separate legal theories within 
                                                          
42
 See supra text accompanying notes xxx – xxx. 
43
 15 U.S.C. § 1. 
44
 15 U.S.C. § 2. 
45
 15 U.S.C. § 3. 
46
 15 U.S.C. § 13. 
47
 15 U.S.C. § 45. 
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each legal regime but instead consider the overall treatment of loyalty 
provisions as a class. 
In recent years, loyalty provisions have received a generally 
hospitable welcome in U.S. the courts, although not so much at the 
Federal Trade Commission.  Private challenges—usually by 
competitors—have alleged that loyalty discounts result in de facto 
exclusivity or semi-exclusivity and foreclose smaller rivals’ 
opportunities to enter or expand in the market.  Such challenges in a 
variety of industries, including boat engines,
48
 medical devices,
49
 
pharmaceuticals,
50
 automotive sandpaper,
51
 wholesale tobacco,
52
 
condoms,
53
 and airline travel,
54
 have generally met with failure.  
Plaintiffs have succeeded in a few cases.
55
  Some courts have held 
that loyalty discounts are price concessions that are not illegal unless 
they result in the dominant firm pricing below an appropriate 
                                                          
48
 Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039 (8
th
 Cir. 2000). 
49
 Southeast Missouri Hosp. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 642 F.3d 608 (8
th
 Cir. 2011); Allied 
Orthopedic Appliances Inc. v. Tyco Health Care Group LP, 592 F.3d 991 (2010). 
50
 J.B.D.L. Corp. v. Wyeth-Ayerst Laboratories, Inc., No. 1:01-CV-704, 1:03-CV-
781, (S.D. Ohio June 13, 2005). 
51
 NicSand, Inc. v. 3M Co., 507 F.3d 442 (2007). 
52
 See Smith Wholesale Co. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 477 F.3d 854, 864-65  
(6
th
 Cir. 2007); Smith Wholesale Co., Inc. v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 219 Fed. 
Appx. 298 (6
th
 Cir. 2007). 
53
 Church & Dwight, supra n. xxx. 
54
 Virgin Atlantic, supra n. xxx. 
55
 See infra text accompanying notes xxx – xxx (concerning FTC action against 
Intel).  See also  Masimo Corp. v. Tyco Health Care Group, L.P., 250 Fed. Appx. 
95 (9
th
 Cir. 2009) (finding that legality of market share discounts in truck 
transmission market was question for jury); Z.F. Meritor LLC v. Eaton Group, 769 
F. Supp. 2d 684 (D. Del. 2011), aff’d 696 F.3d 254 (3d Cir. 2012); U.S. v. Dentsply 
Intern., Inc., 2006-2 Trade Cases P 75,383, 2006 WL 2612167 (D. Del. April 26, 
2006) (prohibiting Dentsply from offering market share discounts to any dealer); 
Natchitoches Parish Hosp. v. Tyco Intern., Ltd., No. 1:05-CV-12024-PBS., (D. 
Mass. Nov. 20, 2009); The allegations in the case,  U.S. v. Dentsply Intern., Inc., 
399 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2005), involved pure exclusive dealing and not loyalty 
discounting. 
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measure of cost.
56
  Since showing below-cost pricing is difficult to 
establish given contemporary U.S. antitrust jurisprudence,
57
 most 
such challenges have failed.  The U.S. Supreme Court has not yet 
heard a loyalty discount case, and U.S. antitrust jurisprudence has not 
settled on a consistent, unified approach to the problem. 
A brief discussion of the two cases mentioned in the 
introduction—Virgin Atlantic and Intel—will illustrate these issues 
and provide some contrast and comparison to the European treatment 
of loyalty discounts.
58
  
Virgin Atlantic arose from one of the many chapters in Sir. 
Richard Branson’s war to break British Airway’s (“BA”) dominance 
in trans-Atlantic travel.  Virgin entered the trans-Atlantic market in 
the mid-1980s and soon grew to be a serious competitor to other 
major U.S.-London carriers, particularly American Airlines and 
British Airways.
59
  In the mid-1990s, partly in response to 
competition from Virgin, British Airways introduced a series of 
“Incentive Plans” targeted at travel agents and corporate buyers.60  
Although some of the incentives were based on volume (how much 
revenue a travel agent pushed in BA’s direction), others were based 
on market share—BA’s percentage share of the U.S.-U.K. flights 
booked by the agent.
61
  The discounts were typically “first dollar,” 
meaning that when a customer reached the target threshold, it 
received a discounted price on earlier purchases.
62
  Virgin brought 
suit, alleging that the incentive agreements, along with BA’s ability 
to prevent Virgin from obtaining necessary slots at London’s 
                                                          
56
 See, e.g., Concord Boat, 207 F.3d at 1062 (rejecting district court’s holding that 
plaintiff would not have to show pricing below an appropriate measure of cost in 
order to establish illegality of market share agreements). 
57
 Daniel A. Crane, The Paradox of Predatory Pricing, 91 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 7 
(2005). 
 
58
 A brief discussion of the treatment of loyalty discounts or rebates outside the 
United States and European Union can be found in EINER ELHAUGE & DAMIEN 
GERADIN, GLOBAL ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 693-94 (2d ed. 2011). 
59
 257 F.3d at 259-60. 
60
 257 F.3d at 261. 
61
 69 F. Supp. 2d at 574 (“Some of the targets are market-share targets (i.e. targets 
based on British Airways’ percentage share of the corporation's U.S.–U.K. flights). 
. . .  Others are total-revenue targets.”). 
62
 257 F.3d at 261. 
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Heathrow airport, were part of an anticompetitive scheme to slow 
Virgin’s growth as a competitor.63 
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York 
granted summary judgment for BA
64
 and the U.S Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit affirmed.
65
  It first found that Virgin’s 
Sherman Act Section 1 claims failed because Virgin failed to show 
“actual adverse effects” on consumer welfare.66  It then affirmed the 
dismissal of Virgin’s attempted monopolization claim on the grounds 
that Virgin failed to show that the incentive agreements resulted in 
BA pricing airline tickets below cost—a requirement for predatory 
pricing claims.
67
  In passing, it made the offhand statement quoted at 
the beginning of this Article:  “These kinds of agreements allow 
firms to reward their most loyal customers. Rewarding customer 
loyalty promotes competition on the merits.”68 
The European Commission,
69
 General Court,
70
 and European 
Court of Justice (“ECJ”)71 reached a very different conclusion on the 
same facts.  In two prior cases, Hoffman-La Roche
72
 and Michelin,
73
 
the ECJ had adopted a presumption that discounts or rebates offered 
by dominant firms to induce customer loyalty were incompatible 
with Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU.  In British Airways, the court 
found that the incentives were prima facie anticompetitive because 
they had the effect of inducing loyalty to a dominant firm.
74
  The 
court did not cite evidence of actual anticompetitive effects in the 
                                                          
63
 257 F.3d at 259. 
64
 69 F. Supp. 2d at 571. 
65
 257 F.3d at 256. 
66
 Id. at 264. 
67
 Id. at 265-69. 
68
 257 F.2d at 265. 
69
 British Airways PLC / Virgin Enterprises, European Commission Prohibition 
Decision (Dec. 13, 1999), http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2000:030:0001:0024:EN:PDF. 
70
 Case T-219/99 British Airways PLC v. Commission, [2003] ECR II-5917. 
71
 British Airways v. Commission, Case C-95/04 P (March 15, 2007). 
72
 Case 85/76, Hoffman-La Roche & Co. v. Commission, 1979 E.C.R. 461 PP89-
91 (E.C.J.) 
73
 Case 322/81, NV Nederlandsche Banden-Industrie Michelin v. Commission, 
1983 E.C.R. 3461 PP75-86 (E.C.J.) 
74
 C-95/04 P (affirming General Court’s finding that “the bonus schemes at issue 
had a fidelity-building effect capable of producing an exclusionary effect”). 
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sense of higher consumer prices or diminished output, finding that 
evidence of actual anticompetitive effects was unnecessary.
75
  Rather, 
in keeping with ECJ precedents, it focused on the generic 
exclusionary potential of the loyalty rebates when exercised by 
dominant undertakings.
76
  
Having found the incentive rebates to be suspect fidelity-building 
devices, the court then considered whether BA had offered an 
“objective economic justification” sufficient to overcome the prima 
facie presumption of illegality.
77
  BA argued that the rebates were 
objectively justified because they helped BA fill empty airplane seats 
and hence contribute toward its high fixed operational costs.
78
  The 
ECJ affirmed the General Court’s rejection of this argument, 
essentially finding that only direct cost savings from the loyalty 
program were the kinds of objective economic justifications 
sufficient to overcome the presumption of illegality for the 
deployment of fidelity discounts by dominant firms.
79
 
The Intel case followed on the heels of Virgin/BA.  The computer 
central processing unit (“CPU”) market has been essentially a 
duopoly since the 1990s, with Intel controlling roughly 80% and 
Advanced Micro Devices (“AMD”) controlling the other 15 to 
20%.
80
  In the late 1990s, Intel began to offer Original Equipment 
Manufacturers (“OEMs”) financial incentives to purchase specified 
levels of their CPU requirements—typically around 80 or 85%– from 
Intel.
81
  AMD complained that these loyalty rebates slowed its 
market share growth and starved it of the capital needed to invest in 
developing new products.
82
  From the early 2000s and continuing to 
some degree until the present, AMD and Intel waged a global 
antitrust war over the legal treatment of Intel’s loyalty discounts.  To 
summarize the headlines briefly, AMD secured early decisions 
                                                          
75
 Case C-95/04 P (“[I]t is not necessary to demonstrate that the abuse in question 
had a concrete effect on the markets concerned.”). 
76
 Id. 
77
 Id. 
78
 Id. 
79
 Id. 
80
 See Daniel A. Crane & Graciella Miralles, Toward a Unified Theory of 
Exclusionary Vertical Restraints, 84 S. Cal. L. Rev. 605, 647-49 (2011) (explaining 
background to AMD/Intel litigation). 
81
 Id. 
82
 Id. 
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against Intel in Japan and Korea, a favorable decision and €1.06 
billion (almost $1.5 billion) fine against Intel from the European 
Commission, and a $1.25 billion settlement payment from Intel, and 
a complaint from the Federal Trade Commission that Intel quickly 
settled.
83
 
Although we have not yet heard the final word from Europe,
84
 the 
Intel case seems to suggest some provisional and fragile 
rapprochement between the U.S. and EU treatment of loyalty 
discounts—at least at the level of public enforcement.  For its part, 
the European Commission seemed to back away from the view 
expressed in Hoffman La-Roche, Michelin, and BA that loyalty 
discounts by dominant firms should be treated as prima facie illegal 
and only permitted if the dominant firm can overcome the high 
hurdle of proving marginal cost efficiencies.  The key turn came in a 
December 2008 “Guidance Paper” on application of Article 102’s 
prohibition on abuse of dominance, in which the Commission staff 
suggested determining whether loyalty discounts are anticompetitive 
using a modified predatory pricing analysis, similar to what some 
U.S. courts and agencies have suggested.
85
 The European antitrust 
community has understood the Guidance Paper as reflecting a 
                                                          
83
 Id. at 648.  
84
 As of this writing, Intel was pressing its appeal from the Commission’s decision 
in the General Court. 
85
 Communication from the Commission — Guidance on the Commission’s 
enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive 
exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52009XC0224(01):EN:NO
T (Dec. 2008).  The Commission’s analysis was similar to that in a 
contemporaneous report on monopolization released by the U.S. Justice 
Department, Competition and Monopoly:  Single-Firm Conduct Under Section 2 of 
the Sherman Act § 6(II) (2008). 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/reports/236681.htm (discussing legal and 
economic standard for judging legality of loyalty discounts).  Three Commissioners 
of the Federal Trade Commission criticized the Justice Department’s report as too 
protective of dominant firms.  FTC Commissioners React to Department of Justice 
Report, “Competition and Monopoly:  Single-Firm Conduct Under Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act, http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2008/09/section2.shtm (Sept. 8, 2008). The 
Obama Antitrust Division withdrew the report in one of its first official acts.  
Justice Department Withdraws Report on Antitrust Monopoly Law, 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2009/245710.htm (May 11, 2009). 
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movement in the Commission away from a “form-based” analysis 
and toward an “effects-based” or functional economic analysis.86  In 
its Prohibition Decision, the Commission began by invoking the 
“form-based” precedents (Hoffman La-Roche, Michelin, and BA), but 
then conducted an “effects-based” modified predation analysis to 
conclude that Intel’s loyalty rebates had an exclusionary effect on 
AMD, and hence on competition.
87
 
A few months after the Commission decision, the FTC brought 
its own action against Intel.
88
  If the Europeans had moved a few 
yards in the American direction, the Americans moved at few feet in 
the European direction.  Consistent with U.S. predatory pricing 
precedent, the Commission alleged that Intel’s rebates would have 
forced AMD to price below cost in order to compete.
89
  However, the 
Commission also gave notice that it intended to push the boundaries 
of traditional, pro-defendant predatory pricing law as applied to 
loyalty discounts.  First, the Commission’s complaint alleged that the 
measure of cost below which Intel priced included “average variable 
cost plus an appropriate level of contribution towards sunk costs.”90  
Since most U.S. courts consider only variable or marginal costs in 
predatory pricing cases,
91
 this was a direct challenge to the 
application of a predatory pricing model in bundled discount cases.
 92
  
Second, the Complaint alleged that, while the Commission was 
prepared to show that Intel was able to recoup its costs of giving 
                                                          
86
 See Neelie Kroes, Member, European Comm'n in Charge of Competition Policy, 
Speech at the Fordham Corporate Law Institute: Preliminary Thoughts on Policy 
Review of Article 82, at 2 (Sept. 23, 2005), available at http:// 
europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/05/537 (advocating 
an effects-based approach to Article 82 enforcement). 
87
 See Crane & Miralles, supra n. xxx at 648-49 (describing Commission’s 
approach). 
88
 In re Intel, FTC Docket No. 9341 (Dec. 16, 2009) (Administrative Complaint), 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9341/091216intelcmpt.pdf. 
89
 Id. at ¶ 53. 
90
 Administrative Complaint ¶ 53.   
91
 III PHILIP AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST Law §§ 739-40 (2007) 
(explaining application of average variable cost test). 
92
 See Daniel A. Crane, Predation Analysis and the FTC’s Case Against Intel, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1617364 (examining ways in 
which FTC’s proposed cost definition faced difficulties given prevailing legal 
standards). 
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loyalty discounts through supracompetitive pricing, recoupment 
should not be a mandatory element of an FTC case challenging 
loyalty discounts.
93
  Since recoupment is an element of a predatory 
pricing case,
94
 this statement also signaled the FTC’s intention to 
move away from restrictive predation rules and analogies toward a 
more interventionist approach toward loyalty discounts.  Whether or 
not these theories would ultimately have held up the Intel case cannot 
inform us, since Intel settled with the Commission a few months 
later.
95
 
If Intel signals some convergence between the views of the 
current European Commission and FTC, it does little to settle the 
issue in the courts where, when push comes to shove, the issue may 
ultimately be resolved.  At a doctrinal level, the treatment of loyalty 
discounts remains polarized, with U.S. courts sometimes following a 
strict predatory pricing approach that plaintiffs (whether private or 
governmental) will find it hard to meet and the official doctrine of the 
EU courts remaining hostile to loyalty discounts by dominant firms.  
In the meanwhile, academic commentators continue to develop new 
theories about the value and threats of loyalty,
96
 and private litigants 
continue to press their cases in the lower courts in the U.S.
97
   
 
C.  Prior Beliefs, Legal Catechisms, and the Formation of 
Antitrust Standards 
 
As noted above, the law governing loyalty discounts remains 
unsettled.  European law has not caught up with the dramatic shift 
from a form-based approach to an effects-based approach tentatively 
proposed by the Commission.
98
  Some U.S. courts have moved in the 
direction of predatory pricing rules for loyalty discounts, but many of 
                                                          
93
 Administrative Complaint ¶ 53.   
94
 Brooke Group, Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224 
(1993) (“The second prerequisite to holding a competitor liable under the antitrust 
laws for charging low prices is a demonstration that the competitor had a 
reasonable prospect, or, under § 2 of the Sherman Act, a dangerous probability, of 
recouping its investment in below-cost prices.”). 
95
 FTC Approves Modified Intel Settlement Order, 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2010/11/intel.shtm (Nov. 2, 2010). 
96
 See supra text accompanying notes xxx – xxx. 
97
 See supra text accompanying notes xxx – xxx. 
98
 See supra text accompanying notes xxx – xxx. 
21
Crane:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2013
92 TEX. L. REV. ___ (2013)  
2013] Bargaining Over Loyalty 22 
 
 22 
the conservative assumptions in these cases are under attack in 
academic literature, and the Supreme Court has not yet weighed in.
99
  
Most of the contests over loyalty discounts have occurred in the last 
decade, which, in the glacial movement of antitrust law, is relatively 
little time in which to form durable rules.  The antitrust law of loyalty 
remains up for grabs. 
Understanding the likely evolution of antitrust law concerning 
loyalty discounts requires some brief observations into how modern 
antitrust law is formed in U.S. courts.  Although predicated on 
statutes, antitrust law evolves in an essentially common-law manner, 
as likely intended by its legislative framers.
100
  That is to say, judges 
announce principles based on analogies from precedent but relatively 
unconstrained by external sources such as deterministic statutory 
language,
101
 threats of Congressional action to overrule unpopular 
results,
102
 or agency rule-making entitled to some degree of judicial 
                                                          
99
 See supra text accompanying notes xxx – xxx. 
100
  See Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 
(1978) (“Congress ... did not intend the text of the Sherman Act to delineate the full 
meaning of the statute or its application in concrete situations. The legislative 
history makes it perfectly clear that [Congress] expected the courts to give shape to 
the statute's broad mandate by drawing on common-law tradition.”); I PHILIP 
AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW P 103d2 (3d ed. 2006) (stating 
that the Sherman Act “invest[ed] the federal courts with a jurisdiction to create and 
develop an ‘antitrust law’ in the manner of the common law courts”); William F. 
Baxter, Separation of Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the “Common Law” 
Nature of Antitrust Law, 60 Tex. L. Rev. 661, 663 (1982)(“Congress adopted what 
is in essence enabling legislation that has permitted a common-law refinement of 
antitrust law through an evolution guided by only the most general statutory 
directions.”); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533, 544 
(1983) (“The statute books are full of laws, of which the Sherman Act is a good 
example, that effectively authorize courts to create new lines of common law.”). 
101
 See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH 
ITSELF 409 (1978) (describing “open-textured” nature of Sherman Act’s language). 
102
 In the modern era, Congress has shown little interest in overturning Supreme 
Court antitrust precedents, as it has done in many other statutory areas.  Following 
the Court’s decision in Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 
U.S. 877 (2007), which jettisoned a nearly century-old rule of per se illegality for 
resale price maintenance, there were Congressional threats of a legislative override.  
Leegin-override legislation has passed committees in both houses of Congress, but 
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deference.
103
  Modern antitrust case law development, if not exactly 
free form, is as free from external constraints as any area of Supreme 
Court jurisprudence. 
When the Supreme Court decides antitrust cases, it of course 
adopts rules or multi-factor standards.  But these legally structured 
liability determinants are often less important to the decision of 
future cases than the atmospheric maxims or legal-economic 
catechisms that the Court announces in the course of adjudication.  
These maxims, which since the Chicago School revolution of the 
1970s have increasingly been drawn from economic theory,
104
 
announce a set of baseline perspectives or Bayesian prior beliefs 
about the competitive practice under consideration.  Their repetition 
in future cases serves as a grounding exercise to orient the court’s 
thinking and justify its decision. 
The best example of this, and the one most relevant to loyalty 
discounting, is predatory pricing.  In the pre-Chicago era, the courts 
and antitrust agencies often viewed aggressive price discounting by 
dominant firms with suspicion.
105
  Aggressive price cutting fell into 
what the Nobel laureate Oliver Williamson once referred to 
antitrust’s “inhospitability tradition.”106 The ascendant Chicago 
                                                                                                                                      
has thus far failed to gain traction in the full Congress.  Joanna Anderson, Senate 
Judiciary Committee Backs Latest Effort to Ban “Vertical Price Fixing,” 11/3/11 
CQ Today (Nov. 3, 2011). 
103
 The Justice Department and Federal Trade Commission have rarely 
promulgated substantive antitrust rules.  See Daniel A. Crane, Technocracy and 
Antitrust, 86 Tex. L. Rev. 1159, 1199 (2008). 
104
 See Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 925 (1979) (describing economic origins of the Chicago School). 
105
 The seminal pre-Chicago case is Utah Pie Co. v. Cont'l Baking Co., 386 U.S. 
685 (1967), which condemned aggressive price competition without any showing 
of adverse anticompetitive effects. 
106
 Oliver E. Williamson, Symposium on Antitrust Law and Economics: 
Introduction, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 918, 920 (1979); see also Oliver E. 
Williamson, Assessing Vertical Market Restrictions: Antitrust Ramifications of the 
Transaction Cost Approach, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 953, 959 
(1979) [hereinafter Vertical Market Restrictions]. Williamson attributed this 
tradition to Donald Turner, then-Assistant Attorney General at the Antitrust 
Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, who was quoted as stating: “I approach 
territorial and customer restrictions not hospitably in the common law tradition, but 
inhospitably in the tradition of antitrust law.” Williamson, Vertical Market 
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School, however, largely dismissed the predation theories and argued 
for far greater tolerance toward unilateral price competition.
107
  Over 
time, the Supreme Court radically altered the reception that unilateral 
price discounts received in the courts, essentially moving them into a 
hospitability tradition.
108
  It did this in part by announcing restrictive 
liability rules—the requirement of pricing below an appropriate 
measure of cost and the recoupment requirement.
109
  But the Court 
accomplished this revolution without investing much effort into 
fleshing out the content of the liability rules.  For example, it has still 
not decided what is the appropriate measure of cost in a predation 
case, an issue on which there has been a circuit split for several 
decades.
110
  Instead, the Court spent much of its time expounding 
atmospheric maxims about why predatory pricing was not likely to 
be a frequent threat to competition and why punishing it would 
threaten the welfare of consumers.  The litany is now often intoned 
catechistically in predation cases:  “predatory schemes are rarely 
tried, and even more rarely successful;”111 because ‘cutting prices in 
order to increase business often is the very essence of competition 
                                                                                                                                      
Restrictions,supra, at 959 (quoting N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N, ANTITRUST LAW 
SYMPOSIUM 29 (1968) (remarks of Stanley Robinson)). 
107
  See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH 
ITSELF 144-60 (1978) (critiquing predatory pricing theories and suggesting that 
predation is unlikely to be a serious problem); John S. McGee, Predatory 
Pricing Revisited, 23 J.L. & Econ. 289, 292 (1980) (arguing that predatory is rare 
and generally an irrational business strategy); Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory 
Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. Chi. L. Rev. 263, 282-97 (1981) 
(dismissing predation strategies as unlikely to be attempted). 
108
 Crane, Paradox of Predatory Pricing, supra n. xxx at 3-4. 
109
 Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 222-23 (holding that predatory pricing plaintiffs 
must show pricing below an appropriate measure of cost and dangerous probability 
that defendant will subsequently recoup its predatory investment through 
supracompetitive pricing). 
110
 On three occasions, the Supreme Court has declined to decide what is the 
appropriate measure of cost for predatory pricing cases.  Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 
222 n.1; Cargill, 479 U.S. at 117-18 n.12; Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 584-85 n.8. 
111
 First intoned in Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 589, and repeated in Cargill, 479 U.S. at 
121 n.17, 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 343 n.5 (1987), Brooke Group, 
509 U.S. at 226, Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 
U.S. 312, 323 (2007). 
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...[;] mistaken inferences ... are especially costly, because they chill 
the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect;”112 “Low 
prices benefit consumers regardless of how those prices are set, and 
so long as they are above predatory levels, they do not threaten 
competition.”113 
The power of these kinds of catechisms lies in their ability to 
direct a judge’s disposition toward such critical matters as allocations 
of burdens of proof, her willingness to dismiss cases, grant summary 
judgment, or otherwise relieve juries of cases, and the exercise of her 
Daubert gate-keeping function as to expert testimony.
114
 Predatory 
pricing cases have become hard to win not primarily because 
plaintiffs cannot come up with theories of below-cost pricing or 
recoupment, but because judges have generally begun with a 
Supreme Court-mandated prior belief that predatory pricing is an 
implausible theory that will often by invoked by inefficient, rent-
seeking competitors that want to increase rather than decrease 
prices.
115
 
If antitrust law proceeds in large part by catechisms, these 
catechisms need not be uniformly in favor of dominant firms. 
Throughout much of antitrust history, the currents have run the other 
way.
116
  The Post-Chicago movement in antitrust law is beginning to 
make in-roads in turning dominant firm practices from the 
hospitability tradition to at least neutral ground.
117
  This is where the 
                                                          
112
 First intoned in Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 594, and repeated in Cargill, 479 U.S. at 
121 n.17, Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 226, Verizon Communcs., Inc. v. Law Offices 
of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 414 (2004); Pacific Bell Tel. Co. v. 
linkLine Communcs., Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 451 (2009). 
113
 First intoned in Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 340 
(1990), and repeated in Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 223, State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 
U.S. 3, 15 (1997); Weyerhaeuser, 549 U.S. at 319; linkLine, 555 U.S. at 451. 
114
  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (requiring courts to 
exclude expert testimony that is not the product of reliable principles and methods). 
115
 See generally Daniel A. Crane, The Paradox of Predatory Pricing, 91 Cornell 
L. Rev. 1 (2005). 
116
 Until it was buried in Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 
28, 35 (2006), the Justice Frankfurter’s maxim that “tying arrangements serve 
hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of competition,” Standard Oil Co. v. 
United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949). 
117
 For example,  in  United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109, 1115 (10th Cir. 
2003), the Tenth Circuit announced that, in light of post-Chicago scholarship on 
25
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rubber hits the road for loyalty discounts in the U.S. courts.  Post-
Chicago theories are chipping away at the Chicago School maxims 
that justified non-intervention for unilateral pricing decisions by 
dominant firms.  As courts sift through these competing assertions, 
they will be looking to come up with not only new legal rules—
which may end up being as banal and non-predictive as exclusive 
dealing law’s “substantial foreclosure” test118—but with new maxims 
or catechisms that express the judiciary’s prior beliefs about the 
likelihood that loyalty discounts are help or harm competition and 
consumer welfare. 
This general pattern is not new, but two conditions of relatively 
recent vintage may exercise important influence over the evolution of 
loyalty discounting norms.  The first is the increasing complexity of 
economic models deployed by academic economists and expert 
witnesses to describe the potential exclusionary effects and 
procompetitive benefits of various competitive practices, including 
loyalty discounts.  Admittedly, technical economic lingo is not new 
to antitrust law.  Formal economic analysis—theoretic and 
empirical—has played an important role in shaping antitrust policy 
since at least the heyday of Harvard School structuralism in the 
1950s and 60s.
119
  And, the Chicago School that succeeded it was 
nominally predicated almost entirely on economic analysis.
120
  The 
difference today is that much of the economic scholarship about 
antitrust issues is no longer expressed in readable prose presenting 
empirical observations (i.e., firms in concentrated industry earn 
higher rates of return on capital) or theoretical ideas (i.e., a firm with 
market power in one market would not engage in tying to obtain 
power in a complementary market since raising prices in the second 
market would reduce demand in the first market).  Rather, much of 
the progress being made in technical economics relating to antitrust 
issues is occurring in papers that engage in complex economic 
modeling that the average lawyer or judge is unlikely to read or 
                                                                                                                                      
predatory pricing, it would no longer  approach predatory pricing cases with “the 
incredulity that once prevailed.” 
118
 Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961) (holding that 
exclusive dealing contracts are only illegal if the y substantially foreclose 
competition in the relevant market). 
119
 See DANIEL A. CRANE & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE MAKING OF COMPETITION 
POLICY:  SELECTED SOURCES (forthcoming 2012). 
120
 Id. 
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understand.
121
  Even when the intuitions behind the models are 
plainly explained, lawyers and judges often find themselves unsure of 
how much weight to put into any particular model, given the number 
of restrictive assumptions made to derive the model’s results.122  As a 
group of economists has explained as to models of loyalty 
discounting, “[t]he academic literature on loyalty discounts and 
exclusive dealing demonstrates that the welfare effects of these 
practices are ambiguous and that market details determine the 
direction of the effect.”123 
Given this reality, the creation of new legal catechisms is 
especially important.  Since judges will rarely have the ability, time, 
or disposition to sort through the competing models and theoretical 
claims on a case-by-case basis (much less submit them unvarnished 
to juries), they will increasingly look to the catechisms to frame their 
decision.  A maxim like the Second Circuit’s Virgin Atlantic 
statement that rewarding customer loyalty through discounts is 
procompetitive and beneficial might have more influence in the 
decision of a case than ten new models showing that loyalty 
discounts can exclude competitors or soften competition.  
Conversely, judicial adoption of a maxim that loyalty discounts are 
                                                          
121
 Michael R. Baye & Joshua D. Wright, Is Antitrust Too Complicated for 
Generalist Judges?  The Impact of Economic Complexity and Judicial Training on 
Appeals, 54 J. L. & Econ. 1 (2011) (reporting empirical study suggesting that some 
antitrust cases are too complicated for generalist judges). 
122
 See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Costs of Movement, 78 
Antitrust L. J. 67, 103 (2012) (noting, as to models of exclusionary effects from 
market share discounts in GPO contracts, that “the assumptions in these models are 
restrictive and they cannot be applied without significant risk of a false signal in 
situations that deviate from their assumption”); Joshua D. Wright, Abandoning 
Antitrust’s Chicago Obsession:  The Case for Evidence-Based Antitrust, 78 
Antitrust L. J. 241, 241 (2012) (discussing “model selection problem” arising from 
“endless number of theoretical models” of causes and welfare consequences of 
different kinds of competitive behaviors). See also Timothy J. Brennan, Is 
Competition the Entry Barrier?  Consumer and Total Welfare Benefits of Bundling 
(AEI/Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, Working Paper No. 05-08 
2005) (showing large array of very different effects that can extrapolated from 
models making different assumptions as to product bundling).  
123
 Assaf Eilat, Jith Jayaratne, Janusz A. Ordover & Greg Shaffer, How Loyalty 
Discounts Can Perversely Discourage Discounting:  Comment, CPI Antitrust 
Chron., Vol. 4, No. 1 (Spring 2010). 
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often just concealed disloyalty penalties—a subject explored in the 
next Part—could have similar power in predisposing the decision of a 
case, even one in which there was not strong evidence that the 
discounts functioned to penalize disloyalty.  Hence, some of the 
highest yield in the current debates over loyalty discounts will come 
from enshrining pro- or anti-loyalty maxims in the catechisms of law. 
The second relatively new condition—and one that is probably, 
for now, less important than the first—is the growing possibility of 
antitrust comparativism. For most of the Sherman Act’s 120-year 
history, antitrust law was largely an American peculiarity.
124
  The EU 
arose as a second developed antitrust system in the 1980s, but, until 
fairly recently, many or most in the U.S. antitrust community viewed 
EU antitrust law as either primitively formalistic or idiosyncratic 
because of the European goals of internal market creation.
125
  But 
now, particularly with the ascendance of effects-based economic 
reasoning, European antitrust law has the potential to provide a 
serious intellectual counterweight to U.S. antitrust law.  Of course, 
the citation of foreign law precedents in U.S. domestic law decisions 
remains controversial,
126
 but it may be less objectionable to consult 
foreign legal precedents that are essentially developing economic 
common law in the manner of Sherman Act jurisprudence than, say, 
deciding on the meaning of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on 
cruel and unusual punishment.  And there is the additional fact that 
big antitrust cases are increasingly played out on a global scale, with 
                                                          
124
 ROBERT PITOFSKY, HARVEY J. GOLDSCHMID & DIANE P. WOOD, TRADE 
REGULATION:  CASES AND MATERIALS 6 (6
th
 ed. 2010) (discussing period when 
antitrust was an American peculiarity and subsequent growth of antitrust regimes 
around the world). 
125
 See Spencer Weber Waller & Robert Stoner, Economists Abroad,  15 SPG- 
Antitrust 66 (2001), reviewing SIMON BISHOP AND MIKE WALKER THE ECONOMICS 
OF EC COMPETITION LAW (1999) (discussing popular view ‘that EU competition 
law is an arid formalistic system of rules devoid of economic analysis”); Josef 
Drexel, Real Knowledge is to Know the Extent of One’s Own Ignorance:  On the 
Consumer Harm Approach in Innovation-Related Competition Cases, 76 Antitrust 
L. J. 677, 697 (2010) (discussing how TFEU goals of enhancing economic 
integration may push EU law away from consumer welfare goals). 
126
 See Daniel A. Farber, The Supreme Court, The Law of Nations, and Citations of 
Foreign Law:  The Lessons of History, 95 Cal. L. Rev. 1335, 1335-36 (2007) 
(discussing controversy around citation of foreign legal decisions in U.S. 
constitutional cases). 
28
Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 72 [2013]
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/72
92 TEX. L. REV. ___ (2013)  
2013] Bargaining Over Loyalty 29 
 
 29 
agencies and courts in multiple jurisdictions plying over the same 
controversies between the same parties.  Recall that the Intel case 
proceeded in Japan, Korea, and Europe before decision at the FTC.
127
  
In this environment, U.S. courts will find it increasingly difficult to 
ignore antitrust developments in the courts and agencies of the 
United States’ important trading partners. 
It is with these background conditions that the formation of 
antitrust policy over loyalty discounting will likely play out.  Unable 
or unwilling to process a large number of complex economic models, 
courts will form judgments based on which theories, in their 
simplified forms, seem most intuitively plausible.  These judgments 
probably will be internalized in the legal system as maxims similar in 
style (although not necessarily in orientation) to those deployed in 
predatory pricing law. As judges make these decisions, they will 
increasingly be influenced by developments abroad, either because 
they will take cognizance of foreign cases or because the learning 
from those cases will infiltrate the U.S. antitrust agency positions, 
parties’ litigation positions, and scholarly literature coming before 
the courts. 
II. DISLOYALTY PENALITIES AND COMPETITION SOFTENING THEORIES 
This Article aims to provide a limited defense of loyalty 
discounts—to argue in favor of maxims that suggest a favorable 
judicial disposition toward such discounts.  To that end, this Part 
responds to the two theories positing that loyalty incentives can harm 
consumer welfare even without excluding rivals: first, that loyalty 
discounts are often just disguised disloyalty penalties and, second, 
that the deployment of loyalty provisions softens competition. 
Because these theories challenge the essential premise of loyalty 
discounting—that these are real discounting mechanisms—they have 
the potential to turn into anti-loyalty maxims with the power 
substantially to erode the use of loyalty-enhancing discounts.  
However, neither theory is sufficiently robust or generalizable to 
serve as the basis for adoption of a new legal maxim. 
 
A.  Loyalty Incentives as Disloyalty Penalties 
    
                                                          
127
 Supra n. xxx at xxx. 
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Most antitrust experts would agree that loyalty incentives can 
have long-run exclusionary effects by discouraging customers from 
switching purchases to rival suppliers, starving the rivals of needed 
revenues, creating a less competitive market, giving the loyalty-
insistent seller market power, and hence enabling that seller to raise 
prices above competitive levels.
128
  However, consistent with the 
Second Circuit’s observation in Virgin Atlantic that rebates to loyal 
customers are a form of reward,
129
 many courts and commentators 
have assumed that the potential long-run threat to competition from 
loyalty discounts must be balanced against the short-run benefit to 
customers from the lower price granted for their fidelity.
130
  This 
view is consistent with the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on 
predatory pricing, which characterizes the short-run pricing discount 
offered by a dominant firm as a substantial benefit to consumers that 
should make courts cautious about imposing antitrust liability based 
on the potential that such pricing could eventually exclude rivals and 
prevent monopolistic pricing at a later time.
131
  Much of the 
                                                          
128
 Even the Bush Administration’s monopolization report, which as noted was 
roundly criticized as too protective of dominant firms, acknowledged this potential.  
Single Firm Conduct, supra n. xxx at 6(II) ([A]s with predatory pricing, single-
product loyalty discounts may be anticompetitive in certain circumstances, such as 
where the resulting price of all units sold to a customer is below an appropriate 
measure of cost. Further, commentators and panelists generally agree that even 
where a single-product loyalty discount is above cost when measured against all 
units, such a discount may in theory produce anticompetitive effects, especially if 
customers ‘must carry a certain percentage of the leading firm’s products’ and the 
discount is structured to induce purchasers to buy all or nearly all needs beyond 
that ‘uncontestable’ percentage from the leading firm.”) 
129
 See supra text accompanying note xxx – xxx. 
130
 See, e.g., Southeast Missouri Hospital, 642 F.3d at 615 (noting that cutting 
prices in order to increase business often is the very essence of competition” and 
repeating Supreme Court’s caution on acceptance of unfair pricing claims); 
Concord Boat, 207 F.3d at 1060 (quoting, in context of market share discount 
analysis, Supreme Court statement “[l]ow prices benefit consumers regardless of 
how those prices are set, and so long as they are above predatory levels, they do not 
threaten competition. Hence, they cannot give rise to antitrust injury”) (citation 
omitted).  
131
 Brooke Group, Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 223 
(1993) (explaining that price discounting is generally beneficial to consumers and 
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hospitability tradition toward unilaterally determined prices comes 
from a belief that “[l]ow prices benefit consumers regardless of how 
they are set, and so long as they are above predatory levels, they do 
not threaten competition.”132 
A growing line of criticism charges that loyalty incentives are 
often not price discounts at all but rather disguised taxes on 
disloyalty.
133
  Although this critique has mostly appeared in academic 
literature, it is beginning to appear in judicial decisions as well.  For 
example, in affirming a plaintiff’s jury verdict based on a claim of 
exclusion through loyalty discounts, the Third Circuit recently 
described threatened losses of market share discounts as “financial 
penalties.”134  The court relied on this characterization in upholding a 
jury verdict finding that the defendant’s market share discounts were 
illegal even though the defendant had not priced above cost.
135
  The 
court apparently believed that penalizing disloyalty was different in 
kind for purposes of antitrust analysis than rewarding loyalty. 
Analytically, whether something is a loyalty discount or 
disloyalty penalty depends critically on the baseline, just as the 
distinction between rewards and punishments depends on the 
                                                                                                                                      
expressing concerns about chilling such price discounting through excessive 
predatory pricing liability). 
132
 Atlantic Richfield  Co. v.  USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 340 (1990). 
133
 See Einer Elhauge, Why Above-Cost Price Cuts to Drive Out Entrants Are Not 
Predatory—And the Implications for Defining Costs and Market Power, 112 Yale 
L. J. 681, 698 n. 53 (2003) (“If loyalty rebates were never illegal unless the 
resulting price were below cost, then any firm could immunize its exclusive-
dealing agreements from antitrust scrutiny by the simple expedient of inflating the 
price and then offering a rebate conditioned on exclusivity.”);  Joseph Farrell, 
Director, Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Economics, Problems with Loyalty 
Pricing, address at the Fourth Annual Searle Research Symposium on Antitrust 
Economics and Competition Policy, Northwestern University (Sept. 23, 2011) 
(describing loyalty discounts as a tax on purchases from competitors); Aaron Edlin 
& Joseph Farrell, Freedom to Trade and the Competitive Process, NBER Working 
Paper  No. 16818 (Feb. 2011), http://www.nber.org/papers/w16818 (describing 
loyalty incentives in multi-product discounting context as taxes on trading with an 
alternative supplier); Fiona Scott-Morton, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, 
Antitrust Division, Contracts that Reference Rivals, (April 5, 2012), at 9 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/281965.pdf (discussing literature 
showing that loyalty discounting serves as a tax on purchasing from rivals); 
Jacobson, supra n. xxx at 2 (“In some instances, moreover, the ‘discount’ might in 
fact be a disguised penalty for ‘disloyal’ buyers.”). 
134
 ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 277 (3d Cir. 2012). 
135
 Id. 
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baseline.
136
  The “discounts as penalties” assertion assumes that the 
baseline price—the price the customer would receive if she refused 
the loyalty discount—is an artificially inflated penalty price and that 
the loyalty discount merely brings the price back to the profit-
maximizing monopoly level.  For purposes of stylizing the disloyalty 
penalty claim, assume that the price the customer would receive 
absent the loyalty incentive is x and the loyalty incentive is 1.  Under 
a discount or reward view, the customer who meets the loyalty 
criteria pays a price of x-1, and hence improves her position as 
compared to the world with no loyalty incentive (putting aside the 
potential of long-run exclusionary effects).  Under the penalty view, 
however, the seller increases his price to x+1 and then offers a 
“discount” of 1 in exchange for loyalty.  The customer who accepts 
the discount achieves merely the but-for price absent the loyalty 
discount; the customer who refuses it pays a disloyalty penalty of 1. 
The penalty view, if widely accepted, would have severe 
consequences for antitrust policy concerning loyalty discounts.  It 
would alter the baseline view of loyalty incentives as price 
concessions that benefit consumers and should only be prohibited if 
they have long-run exclusionary effects.  This would shift loyalty 
incentives out of the broad safety zone for non-predatory unilaterally 
determined prices established in existing case law, just as the Third 
Circuit did in ZF Meritor.
137
 
But the view that loyalty discounts are actually disloyalty 
penalties encounters significant analytical difficulties.  In most 
circumstances, it is doubtful that a seller can successfully threaten or 
implement a disloyalty penalty without impairing its own interests far 
more than those of its customers.  Since a disloyalty penalty would 
usually inflict far more loss to the seller than to the buyer, it is not 
plausible that sellers routinely impose disloyalty penalties. 
To see why, begin with a seller in a competitive market.  Such 
a seller clearly cannot impose a disloyalty penalty on the customer 
who chooses to buy forbidden fruits from the seller’s rival.  In this 
                                                          
136
 See Daryl J. Levinson, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 345, 377 , 377 n. 154 (2003) (observing 
that whether something is a punishment or a reward depends on the baseline); see 
also McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 46 (2002) (“The answer to the question 
whether the government is extending a benefit or taking away a 
privilege rests entirely in the eye of the beholder.”). 
137
 Supra n. xxx. 
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example, x is a competitive market price.  If a seller in a competitive 
market raises its baseline price above the competitive price, 
customers can simply switch to rival sellers.  If the seller offers to 
reduce its price back to the competitive price if the customer remains 
loyal, that will not work either.  From the customer’s perspective, a 
requirement of loyalty is an impairment of its freedom to mix and 
match its purchases from different sellers as it prefers.  The seller’s 
offer of a price of x conditioned on loyalty is less attractive than a 
competitor’s offer of a price of x not conditioned on loyalty.  The 
only way that the seller can successfully use a loyalty incentive is to 
provide a true discount from x—to go back to the standard 
assumption that a loyalty incentive results in x-1.
138
   
Now consider a monopoly seller.  Assuming that he has 
exercised his monopoly power, x will be the profit-maximizing 
monopoly price.
139
  Any disloyalty penalty he would try to set would 
have to be above that price, and hence by definition be less profitable 
to the monopolist than x.  The mere fact that the monopolist might 
threaten to charge an unprofitable price in order to coerce compliance 
is not itself an objection to the disloyalty penalty view.  The basic 
model of monopoly pricing posits that the monopolist threatens 
something unprofitable to itself—withholding sales above marginal 
cost—if the customer refuses to pay the monopoly price.140  The 
difference here is that the monopolist who is already charging the 
profit-maximizing monopoly price is operating in the elastic portion 
of his demand curve.
141
  At this price, customers are willing to 
consider other products or services as substitutes for the monopolist’s 
product or service.  Indeed, the very reason that the monopolist does 
                                                          
138
 It is a standard assumption in the economic literature that the seller must pay the 
buyer to accept an exclusivity condition. Ramusen, Ramseyer & Wiley, supra n. 
xxx at xxx (discussing price monopolist must pay buyers to accept an exclusivity 
commitment upon the threat of new entry). 
139
 W. KIP VISCUSI, JOSEPH E. HARRINGTON, JR. & JOHN M. VERNON, ECONOMICS 
OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 82 (4th ed. 2005) (explaining how monopolist 
sets a profit-maximizing price by equating marginal cost with marginal revenue). 
140
 Mancur Olson, Collective Action, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF 
ECONOMICS 474 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1994); Mancur Olson, THE LOGIC OF 
COLLECTIVE ACTION (2d ed. 1971) [MORE]. 
141
 William H. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 
Harv. L. Rev. 937, 961 (1981) (explaining that “every monopolist faces an elastic 
demand [] at its profit-maximizing output and price). 
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not charge a price higher than x is that, if it did, customers would 
substitute to other suppliers. 
If the monopolist threatens a price above his profit-
maximizing monopoly price, he is threatening to damage himself far 
more than he harms the customer.  Most or all customers who reject 
the monopolist’s insistence on loyalty will not actually incur the 
disloyalty penalty.  They will substitute to other products.
142
  
Although they would prefer to purchase from the monopolist at x, the 
difference to them in utility between buying the monopolist’s product 
at x and substituting to other products is small.  The harm to 
consumers from calling the monopolist’s bluff is slight. 
By contrast, the harm to the monopolist of losing customers 
to substitution to other products is large.  The sales that the 
monopolist makes at the profit-maximizing, elastic portion of its 
demand curve are its most profitable.  When customers substitute to 
other products, the monopolist loses not only market share, but sales 
at a monopoly price.  Further, by inducing its customers to substitute 
to goods or services the customers did not consider good substitutes 
at a price of x, the monopolist runs the risk of losing the customer 
entirely or forever.  Customers who experiment with the goods or 
services of a rival may decide that they prefer the rival’s offerings. 
Even if the monopolist eventually stops threatening a disloyalty 
penalty, they may choose not to return.   
Monopolists who play a disloyalty penalty game in the elastic 
part of their demand curve will usually be taking an unwise risk.  By 
pricing at the profit-maximizing monopoly level, they fully spent 
their market power.  The threat of a yet higher price will usually be 
hollow. 
Einer Elhauge, one of the leading proponents of the disloyalty 
penalty theory, has responded to this view that the monopolist lacks 
the power credibly to threaten an above x disloyalty penalty.
143
  
Elhauge claims that this argument misunderstands the fundamental 
premise of monopoly pricing and, that if it were true, “the seller 
threat under monopoly pricing would not be credible because, if the 
buyer threatened not to buy the product unless the monopolist 
                                                          
142
 This is mathematically a function of the fact that the profit-maximizing 
monopoly price is the highest price the monopolist can charge without seeing its 
customers substitute to other products. 
143
 Einer Elhauge, The Failed Resurrection of the Single Monopoly Profit Theory, 
Competition Policy Int’l, Spring 2010 155 (2009). 
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lowered the price below the monopoly price to some above-cost 
level, the monopolist would find it more profitable to sell at that 
above-cost price than to forego sales and lose all profits to that 
buyer.”144  Since we know that monopoly pricing actually works, 
both in theory and in practice, Elhauge claims that there must be a 
fundamental error in the premise that threatening a price above the 
monopoly level will not work.
145
 Elhauge argues that the buyer who 
is threatened with a disloyalty penalty will accede to loyalty so long 
as her surplus from accepting the monopolist’s demand exceeds her 
surplus from rejecting it.
146
  Even if the customer is harmed less than 
the monopolist by the imposition of the threatened disloyalty penalty, 
collective action problems prevent her from calling the monopolist’s 
bluff.
147
 
Three responses are in order.  First, the consumer’s surplus 
may not be greater if she stays loyal to the monopolist at price x and 
subject to a loyalty restraint rather than switching to a different 
supplier.  The imposition of an onerous contractual term is 
economically equivalent to a price increase.
148
  If, as hypothesized, x 
without a loyalty constraint is the profit-maximizing monopoly price, 
then a price of x plus loyalty constraint, which is a cost to the buyer 
insofar as it deprives her of her freedom of choice, is an effective 
price increase.  Under standard economic assumptions, a price 
increase above the profit-maximizing monopoly price causes 
customers to substitute to new products and services because doing 
so increases their surplus.
149
  Hence, customers will find it preferable 
to substitute to other goods or services rather than to pay the full 
monopoly price and become subject to a restrictive loyalty 
requirement. 
Second, even if the customer would enjoy slightly more 
surplus by purchasing at x (with the loyalty restraint) than by 
substituting to a rival’s offering, it is far from clear that collective 
action problems will make her unwilling to call the monopolist’s 
bluff. The asymmetries between the losses to the monopolist and to 
the customer from customer substitution are large. If the customer 
                                                          
144
 Id. at 178. 
145
 Id. 
146
 Id. at 177. 
147
 Id. 
148
 DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN 
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 57 (4th ed. 2005). 
149
 Thomas G. Krattenmaker et al., Monopoly Power and Market Power in 
Antitrust Law, 76 Geo. L.J. 241, 256 (1987). 
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realizes that she has little to lose by calling the monopolist’s bluff 
and that the monopolist has much to lose, she may push back on the 
monopolist’s demand. 
Finally, it bears returning to the point made a few moments 
ago that a seller in a competitive market cannot impose a disloyalty 
penalty.  Economists and antitrust scholars have long recognized that 
the monopolist who has charged a profit-maximizing monopoly price 
has effectively priced itself into a competitive market and faces 
competition from products that would not be substitutes at a lower 
price point.  The classic exposition of this point arises in the context 
of a fundamental error in economic reasoning—widely known as the 
“cellophane fallacy”—made in a Supreme Court case on market 
definition in the DuPont case.
150
  In DuPont, the question was 
whether the relevant market should be considered just cellophane, in 
which event DuPont would have a monopoly, or whether there was a 
wider market including other flexible packaging materials like 
Pliofilm, glassine, foil, polyethelylene, waxed paper, and Saran 
wrap.
151
  The Court concluded that the market included all flexible 
wrapping materials because there was evidence of substantial cross-
elasticity of demand
152
 between cellophane and the other materials.
153
  
As numerous courts and commentators have pointed out since, the 
fact that consumers considered cellophane and other flexible 
wrapping materials substitutes at prevailing prices did not negate the 
possibility that cellophane was its own relevant market.
154
  If DuPont 
had monopolized the cellophane market and then raised the price of 
                                                          
150
 U.S. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1965). 
151
 Id. at 380. 
152
 Cross-elasticity of demand refers to the increase in demand for one product 
caused by an increase in the price of another. F.M  SCHERER & DAVID 
ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, Third Ed. 
75 (3d. ed. 1990). 
153
 351 U.S. at 400. 
154
 RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 128 (1976); 
ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Market Power Handbook: Competition Law and 
Economic Foundations 59-60 (2005); Jonathan Baker, Market Definition: An 
Analytical Overview, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 129, 162-65 (2007); Lawrence J. 
White, Market Power and Market Definition in Monopolization Cases: A 
Paradigm is Missing, in ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND 
POLICY (Wayne D. Collins ed., A.B.A. Sec. of Antitrust Law 2008); Robert 
Pitofsky, New Definitions of Relevant Market and the Assault on Antitrust, 90 
COLUM. L. REV. 1805, 1814 (1990); 2B Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note xxx, ¶ 
539; Gene C. Schaerr, The Cellophane Fallacy and the Justice Department's 
Guidelines for Horizontal Mergers, 94 Yale L.J. 670 (1985). 
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cellophane to the profit-maximizing monopoly level, other flexible 
wrapping materials would become good substitutes for cellophane at 
the monopoly price.   
As the cellophane case illustrates, the monopolist who has 
charged the profit-maximizing price is operating in a competitive-like 
environment, one where the monopolist faces meaningful constraints 
on its pricing and output decisions because consumers have 
meaningful choices at prevailing prices.  In such a circumstance, the 
monopolist has no more power to threaten a disloyalty penalty than 
any other seller in an ordinary competitive market. 
Thus far, we have considered firms in competitive markets 
and monopolists charging the profit-maximizing monopoly price.  
Three more circumstances warrant mention:  sellers with some 
degree of market power in oligopoly markets, sellers of any kind 
engaging in price discrimination, and monopolists engaged in limit 
pricing. 
Putting aside for a moment the competition softening theories 
discussed in the next part, the case of the oligopolist is just a weaker 
version of the case of the monopolist.  Like the monopolist, the 
oligopolist maximizes its profits by equating marginal revenue to 
marginal cost and is constrained to raise its price any further because 
consumers will substitute to rival sellers.
155
  Oligopolists, like 
monopolists, price in the elastic part of their demand curve where 
they have essentially spent all of their market power.  Indeed, under a 
conventional kinked demand curve model of oligopoly pricing, the 
demand above the prevailing oligopoly price is so elastic that the 
oligopolist who unilaterally raises his price will lose nearly all of her 
sales.
156
  Hence, absent collusion between oligopolists (discussed 
next), an oligopolist cannot credibly threaten a disloyalty penalty if it 
is already charging the profit-maximizing oligopoly price. 
The same is true of a firm that is engaging in price 
discrimination—charging different prices to different buyers based 
on their different willingness to pay.
157
  As to disloyalty penalties, 
                                                          
155
 DANIEL S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 457-58 (6
th
 ed. 
2005) (discussing oligopoly pricing). 
156
 In the model, the kink occurs because each firm believes that if it raises its price 
above the current price none of its competitors will follow suit.  Conversely, each 
oligopolist also believes that if it lowers its price, all other firms will also lower 
theirs.  But see George J. Stigler, The Kinky Oligopoly Demand Curve and Rigid 
Prices, 55 J. POL. ECON. 432 (1947) (providing theoretical criticisms of the 
kinked curve model). 
157
 Pindyck & Rubinfeld, supra n. xxx at 383 (defining price discrimination). 
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price discrimination is just a microcosm of monopoly pricing.  The 
seller sets its price to each buyer based on its perception of the 
buyer’s maximum willingness to pay.158  Instead of having a unified 
x, we have instead a series of xs corresponding to buyers’ separate 
reservation prices.  If the monopolist imposes a loyalty condition on 
top of x, he will lose the sale because he has exceeded the buyer’s 
reservation price.  Loyalty prices must thus be below x in order to 
stick. 
Finally, we come to the firm with market power that is 
engaging in limit pricing—a price below the short-run profit-
maximizing price designed to discourage new entry or substitution to 
rivals.
159
  This is the one circumstance where the seller might 
realistically threaten a disloyalty penalty above x.  By holding back 
from the profit-maximizing monopoly price, the seller has reserved 
some of its market power and can hence impose a penalty above x 
without triggering substitution to rivals and the loss of profitable 
sales.  Still, even this strategy will be risky for the limit-pricing seller 
who, by definition is concerned that approaching the monopoly price 
will facilitate new entry or the expansion of competitors.   
In sum, it is not impossible for sellers to threaten disloyalty 
penalties, just risky and unlikely in most circumstances.  As a 
baseline view or Bayesian prior belief, it is far more likely that most 
loyalty discounts are true discounts—prices below x. 
 
B.  Competition Softening 
 
A second strand of the anti-loyalty discount literature attacks 
loyalty inducement as a means of softening competition between 
oligopolists.  Competition softening refers to the effect resulting from 
the adoption of practices by one or more oligopolists that deter their 
rivals from competing as aggressively as they otherwise would.
160
  
                                                          
158
 Id. at 383-93. 
159
 See Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Limit Pricing and Entry Under Incomplete 
Information: An Equilibrium Analysis, 50 Econometrica 443, 444-45 (1982); Joe 
Bain, A Note on Pricing in Monopoly and Oligopoly, 39 Am. Econ. Rev. 448, 454 
(1949); F.M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND 
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 356-66 (3d ed. 1990); JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF 
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 367-74 (1992); Viscusi, supra n. xxx at 177-90.; 
Clark, Toward a Concept of Workable Competition, 30 AMER. ECON. REV. 241, 
247-48 (1940). 
160
 Kaplow & Shapiro, supra n. xxx at xxx. 
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Examples of practices that have been accused of softening 
competition include contracts that reference rivals,
161
 resale price 
maintenance,
162
 product differentiation,
163
 price-matching clauses,
164
 
and most favored nations clauses.
165
  Unlike theories that rely on the 
exclusion of a rival to produce anticompetitive effects, competition 
softening theories allow for entry and competition by rivals, but with 
diminished incentives to engage in aggressive price competition. 
Commentators have postulated that loyalty discounts can have 
competition softening effects.
166
  Elhauge and Wickelgren offer the 
fullest explanation.
167
 In their model, when a monopolist reacts to the 
possibility of new entry by offering a loyalty discount and this results 
in some buyers who are committed to the monopolist and other 
buyers who are not and therefore are “free,” the monopolist faces a 
diminished incentive to match the new entrant’s prices for “free” 
buyers since that would further undermine the monopolist’s price to 
                                                          
161
 Interview with Fiona Scott Morton, DAAG for Economic Analysis at the DOJ, 
26-SPG Antitrust 14, 17 (2012) (asserting that contracts that reference rivals can 
both exclude new entrants and soften competition). 
162
 Avishalom Tor & William J. Rinner, Behavioral Antitrust:  A New Approach to 
the Rule of Reason After Leegin, 2011 U. Ill. L. Rev. 805, 812 (2011); Patrick Rey 
& Joseph Stiglitz, The Role of Exclusive Territories in Producers' Competition, 26 
RAND J. Econ. 431, 432 (1995). 
163
 JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 286 (1988) ( “Firms 
want to differentiation to soften price competition.”). 
164
 Stephen C. Salop, Practices That (Credibly) Facilitate Oligopoly Coordination, 
in NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ANALYSIS OF MARKET 
STRUCTURE 279-82 (Joseph E. Stiglitz & G. Frank Mathewson eds., Macmillan 
1986). 
165
 Aaron S. Edlin, Do Guaranteed-Low-Price Policies Guarantee High Prices, 
and Can Antitrust Rise to the Challenge?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 528 (1997); 
Jonathan B. Baker, Vertical Restraints with Horizontal Consequences: Competitive 
Effects of “Most-Favored-Customer” Clauses, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 517 
(1996); Thomas E. Cooper, Most-Favored-Customer Pricing and Tacit Collusion, 
17 RAND J. Econ. 377 (1986). 
166
 See Faella, supra n. xxx at 381 (discussing potential of antitrust claim based on 
competition-softening effects of loyalty discounts). 
167
 Elhauge & Wickelgren, Anti-competitive Exclusion, supra n. xxx at 3. 
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committed buyers.
168
  Elhauge and Wickelgren believe that this 
would occur because they understand the loyalty discount as a 
discount off of the price offered to buyers who did not agree to the 
loyalty contract—what is often referred to as the list price.169  They 
apparently assume that the incumbent would have to respond to the 
new entrant’s solicitation of free buyers by lowering its list price, 
which would trigger an unprofitable reduction of its prices to its 
committed buyers as well. 
This assumption is counterfactual, or at least not generalizable.  
There is nothing to say that a firm offering loyalty discounts to 
committed buyers has to lower its list price to attract free buyers 
when an entrant begins to compete for their business.  In most 
interactions between corporate buyers and sellers, list prices are 
understood to be nominal—the starting place for further negotiation 
and discounting.
170
  Prices are set to individual buyers by a 
combination of terms, discounts, rebates, incentives, and side deals. 
Consider two examples.  First, consider a typical pricing structure 
for a medical device—in this case a catheter.171  A hospital that wants 
to buy catheters will usually belong to at least one GPO, but often it 
will decide to join several GPOs in order to be able to select the best 
starting prices it can on a product-by-product basis.
172
  Access to a 
GPO contract generally involves no commitment by the buyer to 
purchase anything from the seller.
173
  Often, a GPO contract will list 
                                                          
168
 Id. at 3 (“Price-matching clauses instead involve seller commitments to match 
rival prices, whereas loyalty discounts involve no such seller commitment to match 
and indeed have the opposite effect of discouraging sellers from matching rival 
prices for free buyers.”). 
169
 Id. at 8 n.10 (“[A]greeing to a loyalty discount simply means that the buyer 
receives a discount from the price (often called a ‘list price’) offered to buyers who 
did not agree to a loyalty contract.”). 
170
 See, e.g., St. Francis Med. Ctr. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 657 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1078 
(E.D. Mo. 2009) (describing GPO prices as “helpful in establishing the market 
price for a particular product and in establishing a starting point for negotiations for 
lower-priced commodity products.”).  
171
 The following facts are largely taken from St. Francis Medical, 657 F. Supp. 2d 
at 1069. 
172
 Id. at 1079 (noting that “hospitals can often belong to more than one GPO and 
often switch from one GPO to another’”). 
173
 Id. 
40
Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 72 [2013]
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/72
92 TEX. L. REV. ___ (2013)  
2013] Bargaining Over Loyalty 41 
 
 41 
a number of sellers of the same product from whom the hospital can 
choose to buy.
174
  Prices under the GPO contract are ascertained by 
tiers that combine volume and market share requirements—for 
example, a requirement that the hospital buy at least $100,000 and 
85% of its requirements within the product category from the 
vendor.
175
  Sometimes, the more advantageous tiers require that the 
hospital purchase from the seller across multiple product lines, thus 
injecting an element of bundling into the equation.
176
 Although a 
member of the GPO is entitled to purchase under the GPO contract, 
nothing requires the hospital to do so.  Hospitals may, and often do, 
elect to negotiate directly with suppliers.
177
  Even hospitals that buy 
under GPO contracts sometimes negotiate side-deals for extra 
discounts or rebates on top of the GPO contracts.  GPO contracts do 
not force hospitals to purchase in any particular way, nor do they 
guarantee that the manufacturer will not offer other customers lower 
prices outside of the GPO contract. 
Or consider the way that Intel set its computer chip prices to 
OEMs, as described in the European Commission’s prohibition 
decision.  Like the medical device manufacturers, Intel started with a 
“Customer Authorized Price,” essentially a list price, which then 
became a target for OEMs to dicker for price reductions.
178
 Intel then 
offered a series of discounting, rebating, or funding possibilities 
based on a variety of criteria such as the introduction of new 
technologies or an OEM’s efforts to promote Intel products.179  These 
were just Intel’s formal pricing programs.  When it came to real 
pricing, Intel negotiated individually with OEMs and retailers over 
tailored pricing concessions.  For example, Dell received discounts or 
rebates pursuant to a program formally structured by Intel for Dell, 
various short-term price concession agreements, and one-off deals.
180
 
As these examples illustrate, corporate-to-corporate price setting 
is rarely as simple as setting a list price and a schedule of discounts 
                                                          
174
 Id. (reporting that the Premier GPO included four competitors selling catheters 
in its GPO contract). 
175
 Id. at 1080. 
176
 Id. at 1080-81. 
177
 Id. at 1081-82. 
178
 Intel Prohibition Decision, supra n. xxx at ¶ 175. 
179
 Id. at ¶¶ 177-78. 
180
 Id. 
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for loyal customers.  Sellers and buyers—both committed and free— 
constantly bargain over price and loyalty, adjusting their bargains as 
market and competitive conditions change.  Effective prices are often 
hidden under layers upon layers of contracts, schedules, side-letters, 
and one-off pricing deals.   
Given these conditions, it is difficult to see how loyalty 
discounting softens competition or contributes to oligopolistic pricing 
coordination.  When new firms or technologies enter the market, all 
buyers—whether committed or uncommitted—will scramble to 
deploy their added leverage to exact additional concessions from the 
monopolist seller.  The monopolist need not respond by offering a 
uniform set of prices and pricing concessions for loyal and disloyal 
customers.  Rather, it will continue to do what it did before there was 
new entry—try to exact the maximum price it can from each 
customer given market realities and try to disguise its most favorable 
prices to its customers with the greatest buying power so that other 
customers will not clamor for similar discounts. 
Further idiosyncrasies with Elhauge and Wickelgren’s model 
render it inapplicable to the large majority of recently contested 
loyalty discount cases.  They assume a market with an incumbent 
monopolist and only one potential rival,
181
 a scenario that matches 
virtually none of the recently contested loyalty discount cases.
182
 
They assume that a loyalty contract entails a commitment by the 
buyer to purchase 100% of its requirements from the seller.
183
 But in 
most contemporary loyalty discount situations, the buyer can achieve 
the seller’s best price by buying some lesser amount than its full 
requirements from the seller.
184
  For example, in Concord Boat, 
customers obtained the maximum market share discount by buying 
70% of their boat engine requirements from the defendant, 
Brunswick.
185
  Intel generally required computer manufacturers to 
                                                          
181
 Elhauge & Wickelgren, supra n. xxx at 42. 
182
 See supra text accompanying notes xxx - xxx. 
183
 Id. at 8 (positing that “buyers commit to buy only from the incumbent in 
exchange for receiving a discount . . off the price that [the incumbent] offers to 
buyers who do not sign the contract”). 
184
 See supra text accompanying notes xxx – xxx.  
185
 207 F.3d at 1044.  Of note, when Brunswick attempted to increase the loyalty 
level to 95% in 1994, its effort was beaten back “due to serious backlash from boat 
builders.”  Id. at 1044-45. 
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make 80%-95% of their purchases from Intel to secure a loyalty 
rebate.
186
  In the GPO cases, customers generally maximize their 
loyalty discount with a purchase of 80-85% of their requirements 
from the seller and can still obtain loyalty discounts at rates as low as 
50%.
187
  R.J. Reynolds required an 85% market share for its best 
price.
188
  The fact that loyalty discounts are often awarded for less 
than full loyalty is significant, because smaller rivals or new entrants 
have an opportunity to obtain significant sales from customers 
without increasing the price the customer pays for its purchases from 
the dominant seller.
189
  Finally, although Elhauge and Wickelgren 
consider models where the customer contractually commits to 
purchase under the loyalty discount program and ones where the 
customer can obtain the loyalty discount without making any ex ante 
commitment, they obtain much stronger results when the buyer is 
required to make an ex ante commitment.
190
  As already noted, a 
                                                          
186
 Paul Jones, American Antitrust Jurisprudence Applied to European Commission 
v. Intel, 7 B.Y.U. Int’l L. & Mgmt. Rev. 52, 55-56 (2010) (summarizing Intel’s 
market share discount provisions to OEMs). 
187
 See Southeast Missouri Hospital, 642 F.3d at 610-11 (reporting that hospitals 
achieved the maximum market share rebate at 85% of their catheter requirements 
and received loyalty rebates for purchasing as few as 50% of their requirements 
from C.R. Bard);  
188
 477 F.3d at 858. 
189
 Greg Shaffer and Zhijun Chen have argued that partial exclusive dealing can  
threaten competition even more than pure exclusive dealing since the monopolist 
must pay customers to enter into exclusive dealing relationships and can do so 
more cheaply by purchasing only partial loyalty.    Zhijun Chen & Greg Shaffer, 
Naked Exclusion and Minimum-Share Requirements, Presentation at University of 
East Anglia (June 2010), available at 
http://competitionpolicy.ac.uk/documents/107435/107590/greg_shaffer_new_slides
.pdf.  While their model is intriguing as an explanation for how monopolists might 
afford a campaign to exclude rivals, it does not respond to the observation that 
partial exclusivity commitments foreclose less of the market than pure exclusive 
dealing and therefore may leave rivals room to enter or expand in the market.  See 
Daniel A. Crane & Graciella Miralles, Toward a Unified Theory of Exclusionary 
Vertical Restraints, 84 S. Cal. L. Rev. 605, 638-46 (2011) (discussing economic 
meaning of exclusive dealing law’s substantial foreclosure requirement). 
190
 Id. at 27-40. 
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buyer commitment to future loyalty was not at issue in mot of the 
contemporary loyalty discount cases. 
There is another peculiarity about thinking of loyalty discounts as 
competition-softening devices.  Competition-softening theories 
generally assume that the function of a competition-softening device 
is to facilitate supra-competitive pricing by oligopolists.
191
  
Oligopolists generally benefit from competition-softening devices at 
the expense of consumers.  If a loyalty discount operated to make the 
incumbent monopolist less willing to match a new entrant’s prices to 
“free” customers, then this should benefit the new entrant.  In that 
case, we should not expect to see many cases in which smaller rivals 
complain about their dominant competitor’s use of loyalty discounts.  
But that is exactly what we observe in virtually all of the recently 
contested loyalty discount cases.
192
  The fact that competitors are the 
chief complainants about loyalty discounts does not mean that these 
devices are not anticompetitive—they could still be exclusionary.  
But it does mean that they are unlikely to be competition softening 
devices, as that concept is usually understood. 
In sum, it is possible to create models in which the use of loyalty 
clauses softens competition.  It is unlikely, however, that these 
models are useful in describing the key questions that antitrust law 
needs to address today.   
Even if the disloyalty penalty and competition softening claims 
are not generalizable, this does not mean that loyalty incentives are 
always pro-competitive.  Rather, it means that loyalty discounts 
should continue to be evaluated for exclusionary effects—generally, 
the foreclosure of rivals’ ability to compete in the market.193  
III. LOYALTY AND THE CUSTOMER PERSPECTIVE 
The previous Part responded to two criticisms of loyalty 
discounting and hence played a defensive role with respect to loyalty 
incentives.  This final Part presents an affirmative case for loyalty 
discounting from the buyer’s perspective.  It does not attempt an 
                                                          
191
 See, e.g., Salop & Cooper, supra n. xxx  (discussing use of matching the 
competition clauses as facilitating practices that soften competition in concentrated 
markets). 
192
 See supra text accompanying notes xxx-xxx. 
193
 On the meaning of the foreclosure requirement, see Crane & Miralles, supra n. 
xxx at 633-45. 
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exhaustive catalog of the ways that loyalty discounts benefit buyers, 
some of which were already discussed in the context of 
distinguishing loyalty and volume-based discounts in Part I(A).  
Rather, it shows that the conduct of buyers in not only accepting, but 
in some cases in soliciting, loyalty discounts is an important piece of 
empirical evidence in considering their effects on buyers.  To that 
end, this Part first discusses why buyer initiation should be relevant 
to the antitrust inquiry and responds to critics who claim that it 
should not.  It then provides examples of loyalty discounts that have 
been solicited or approved by dominant buyers who are unlikely to 
be the victims of the sorts of collective action problems that could 
lead buyers to grudgingly accept contractual provisions that are not in 
their collective interests.  Finally, it considers the relevance of a 
strand of management literature discussing the benefits to buyers of 
entering into loyalty relationships with suppliers. 
 
A. The Relevance of Buyer Demand for Loyalty Discounts 
 
Antitrust suspicion of loyalty incentives is motivated by the fear 
that such incentives could harm the interests of buyers by enabling 
sellers to obtain market power and to charge higher prices.  Hence, 
evidence that buyers affirmatively seek or approve of loyalty 
discounts could provide some counter-evidence to this suspicion.
194
  
And, indeed, buyers are often the instigators in seeking loyalty 
discounts or other contractual terms that restrict their ability or 
incentives to purchase from alternative suppliers
195
   
                                                          
194
See Richard M. Steuer, Customer-Instigated Exclusive Dealing, 
68 ANTITRUST L.J. 239 (2000) (arguing that buyer-initiated exclusive dealing 
should sometimes be treated more favorably than seller-initiated ones, on the 
theory that buyer initiation provides some evidence that the contract is not against 
the buyer’s interests). 
195
 See, e.g.,  NicSand, 507 F.3d at 454 (observing that “[a]ccording to NicSand’s 
own complaint, all but one of the large retailers made exclusivity a condition for 
doing business with a new supplier .... If retailers have made supplier exclusivity a 
barrier to entry, one cannot bring an antitrust claim against a supplier for 
acquiescing to that requirement”); White & White, Inc. v. American Hospital 
Supply Corp.,540 F. Supp. 951 (W.D. Mich. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 723 
F.2d 495 (6th Cir. 1983) (upholding arrangement where twenty-nine hospitals 
formed a purchasing group and agreed to purchase from a single medical products 
supplier offering nationwide distribution). 
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Nonetheless, the mere fact that buyers are sometimes complicit in 
loyalty discount schemes is not, in itself, conclusive evidence in 
support of loyalty discounts’ procompetitive potential. Einer 
Elhauge, one of loyalty discounts’ leading critics, has argued that 
buyer-initiation of loyalty discounts is irrelevant.
196
  Elhauge 
observes that buyers who enter into anticompetitive loyalty contracts 
impose externalities on other buyers and that buyer face collective 
action problems in minimizing these externalities.
197
  Elhauge argues 
that these effects are exacerbated if the buyer is an intermediary 
purchaser that can pass along most of any anticompetitive overcharge 
to its own downstream buyers.
198
  Fleshing out this intuition, Elhauge 
and Wickelgren propose a model under which there exists no 
equilibrium in which all buyers reject the seller’s offer of a loyalty 
inducement; hence the seller’s offer becomes coercive.199  Buyers 
have no choice but to accept, because they will feel the exclusionary 
effect whether or not they do and are better off at least taking the 
crumbs offered under the guise of a loyalty discount. 
Once again, it is questionable whether the assumptions 
underlying this model are sufficiently general to make the model 
analytically useful in deriving antitrust rules for the sorts of loyalty 
discounts at issue in contemporary antitrust litigation.  Elhauge and 
Wickelgren assume that in order to secure loyalty commitments, the 
buyer must contractually commit to purchase only from the seller.
200
  
That assumption does not generally hold for two reasons.  First, most 
of the loyalty discounts at issue in recent cases did not involve any 
contractual commitment of loyalty by the buyer.  Usually, the buyer 
remained contractually free to purchase goods from whomever it 
chose, but received a better price for exhibiting loyalty to the 
seller.
201
  Second, Elhauge and Wickelgren assume that, in order to 
secure the loyalty discount, the buyer must agree not to purchase 
goods from any of the seller’s rivals—that is to say, they assume pure 
                                                          
196
 Elhauge, Failed Resurrection, supra n. xxx at 183. 
197
 Id. 
198
 Id. 
199
 Elhauge & Wickelgren, Robust Exclusion, supra n. xxx at 3. 
200
 Id. at 4. 
201
 See supra text accompanying notes xxx – xxx. 
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exclusive dealing.
202
  As noted earlier, however, most of the loyalty 
discounts challenged in recent cases have required only partial 
loyalty commitments—often in the 80-90% range.203 
There is a more general point about the collective action 
explanation for buyers’ acceptance of loyalty discounts.  Collective 
action problems would explain why buyers who cannot coordinate 
with other buyers and are price takers would succumb to loyalty 
discounts.  It would not explain why dominant buyers who can and 
do coordinate with other buyers or who have the power 
independently to shape the seller’s pricing conduct would accept 
loyalty discounts.  Thus, evidence that dominant buyers or buyers 
who coordinate with other buyers actively solicit loyalty discounts 
undermines any claim that loyalty discounts are generally explicable 
because of cost externalization and buyer collective action problems. 
As with any of the claims discussed in this paper, evidence of 
loyalty discount solicitation or approval by dominant or coordinating 
buyers does not eliminate the possibility that loyalty discounts are 
anticompetitive.  They could still be anticompetitive in circumstances 
where buyers are price takers or cannot coordinate.  But evidence that 
powerful buyers affirmatively seek loyalty discounts does suggest 
that loyalty discounts may provide important benefits to all buyers.  
As courts decide whether to treat loyalty discounts with hospitability 
or inhospitability, evidence of buyer solicitation may be significant.  
With that background, we turn to two examples of dominant or 
coordinating buyers who actively use loyalty incentives to reduce 
their acquisition costs. 
 
B. Examples of Loyalty Discounts Sought by Dominant Buyers 
 
1. The Federal Government 
 
The federal government is the world’s largest purchaser.204  In 
recent years, federal government procurement administrators have 
emphasized the importance of leveraging the federal government’s 
                                                          
202
 Elhauge & Wickelgren, Robust Exclusion, supra n. xxx at 4 (“[W]e do not 
consider discounts based on partial loyalty.  We assume loyalty discount contracts 
require the buyer to not purchase any goods from the rival.”). 
203
 Supra text accompanying notes xxx – xxx. 
204
 Peter Orszag, Director, Office of Management and Budget, Buying in Bulk, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/blog/10/06/30/Buying-in-Bulk (June 30, 2010). 
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massive spending power to reduce acquisition costs and save 
taxpayers money.
205
  For example, in a statement to the Senate 
Budget Committee, the Administrator for Federal Procurement in the 
Office of Management and Budget listed the procurement initiatives 
federal agencies had recently implemented in order to more 
efficiently use taxpayer resources.
206
 Included in these was a strategic 
sourcing initiative, in which agencies leverage their collective buying 
power in order to secure better discounts from contractors. In order to 
do this, agencies necessarily have to give up some amount of 
individual choice in supplier and start using certain types of products 
agency-wide or government-wide (such as office supplies). The 
Administrator gave one example of DHS switching over to a 
standardized department-wide operating system, and then negotiating 
one contract for the full suite of desktop services at a substantial 
savings.
207
 
Federal procurement administrators have stressed the desirability 
of using the Government’s massive spending power to negotiate 
substantial discount terms.  Among the cost-lowering tools urged by 
procurement officers are Blanket Purchase Agreements (“BPAs”), 
which secure supplier commitments to supply to federal buyers at 
reduced costs.
208
 Although federal administrators stress the 
importance of supplier competition at the contract negotiation 
                                                          
205
 Id. (explaining the importance of leveraging the federal government’s spending 
power to lower acquisition costs). 
206
 Statement of the Honorable Daniel I. Gordan, Administrator for Federal 
Procurement, Office of Management & Budget, Before the Senate Committee on 
the Budget (July 15, 2010), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/testimony/ofpp/Gord
on_testimony_715.pdf; Paul A. Denett, Administrator for Federal Procurement, 
Office of Management & Budget, Memorandum, Guidance on Agency Fiscal Year 
2007 Strategic Sourcing Reports (Mar. 11, 2008), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/procurement/strat_sourc/2007_r
eport_guidance.pdf. 
207
 Id. at 4 (“For example, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) expects to 
save more than $87 million during the next six years by having standardized 
department-wide desktop operating systems, e-mail, and office automation and 
then negotiating a department-wide BPA for the full suite of products at a 
substantial savings.”). 
208
 Daniel I. Gordon, Administrator for Federal Procurement, Office of 
Management & Budget, Memorandum, Achieving Better Value from Our 
Acquisitions (Dec. 22, 2009), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/procurement_memo/Achi
eving_Better_Value_from_Acquisitions.pdf. 
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stage,
209
 they also acknowledge the discount benefits of strategic 
sole-source contracting.
210
  Federal law permits sole source 
contracting under some circumstances
211
 and federal administrators 
have defended it as a means of securing superior contractual terms.
212
  
Although the federal government often simply leverages its 
buying volume to secure superior prices, it also engages in the 
loyalty-bargaining strategy of trading government market share for 
superior pricing.  Airline travel is a case in point.  The Government 
Services Agency (“GSA”) negotiates price schedules with airlines for 
various routes that are contingent upon the federal government’s 
delivery of minimum market share of federal travel.  As the GSA 
explains: 
                                                          
209
  Better Value from Our Acquisitions (Dec. 22, 2009), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/procurement_memo/Achi
eving_Better_Value_from_Acquisitions.pdf (“The GAO found that agencies did 
not take advantage of opportunities for competition in establishing BPAs – a sure 
way to get better deals – and often considered only one vendor.  Frequent use of 
single award BPAs resulted in a lack of competition on resulting orders.”).  See 
also Government Services Administration, Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) 
Sheet, Federal Strategic Sourcing Initiative (FSSI), Office Supply Blanket Purchase 
Agreements (BPAs), available at 
http://www.dm.usda.gov/procurement/toolkit/FSSIOfficeSupplyBPAsFAQs.pdf 
(last accessed Nov. 5, 2011).  
210
 Id. (“Seek discounts when establishing schedule BPAs and, as appropriate, 
when placing orders, especially large dollar orders.  Discounts may be sought in a 
number of ways, such as in the request for quote when establishing the BPA or 
during negotiations.  Agencies should consider making the offer of a discount by 
the contractor a condition for awarding the BPA. For existing BPAs, focus on those 
for which no discount has been sought, especially for products and where only one 
BPA has been awarded.  If, upon review, the agency determines that renegotiation 
of a BPA could lead to discounts—or deeper discounts—for agency buyers, 
explore, in consultation with agency counsel, what options are immediately 
available.”). 
211
 Competition in Contracting Act (“CICA”), 41 U.S.C. § 3301 (2006).  Sole 
source contracting bears greater risks to competition than contractual terms 
rewarding loyalty, since under sole-source contracting there is neither competition 
for the contract nor competition under the contract. 
212
 Joseph Jordan, Senate Subcommittee on Contracting 
Oversight, Contracting Preferences for Alaska Native Corporations (July 16, 2009) 
(“In terms of sole source authority not providing the best value, I do somewhat 
reject that on its premise….in every contract, and this also applies to all sole source 
contracts, the contracting office  must certify that the government got fair and 
reasonable value and it must monitor performance of that contract and can 
terminate it if the contracting officer sees fit. So to say that the government did not 
get the best value because it was sole sourced is, or should be, inaccurate.”). 
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GSA concentrates on the government’s market share to make 
the most of the competition available.  The government 
traveler’s responsibility is to use the contract carrier.  The 
government’s delivery of market share drives the program.  
So, to ensure the fares stay favorable, we encourage federal 
travelers to use the contract carrier.
213
 
 
It is hard to imagine that the federal government, whose 
employees probably fly hundreds of millions of miles a year, is a 
victim of a collective action problem that forces the GSA to offer 
market share commitments in exchange for not being penalized by 
disloyalty discounts.  A far more plausible explanation is that the 
federal government is a big, powerful, and sophisticated buyer that 
has figured out how to offer market share (i.e., loyalty)—and not just 
volume—as a bargaining chip to decrease its input acquisition costs. 
 
2. Buying Organizations 
 
Another piece of evidence pointing against the claim that buyer 
initiation or approval of loyalty discounts does not count since buyers 
face intractable collective action problems is the pervasive 
deployment of loyalty discounts by buyers’ organizations that come 
into being precisely in order to coordinate buyer decisions and hence 
solve collective action problems.  These are matters of degree, since 
coordinated action by just a few buyers in a market with many buyers 
would not overcome buyer-wide collective action problems.  
However, when buyers create buying organizations representing 
large percentages of the buyers in a market expressly for the purpose 
of leveraging buyer power and driving down prices and those 
organizations then bargain for loyalty discounts, the cost 
externalization/collective action story becomes much less persuasive. 
Buyers’ organizations in various health care fields provide strong 
examples of power buyers deploying their bargaining power to exact 
loyalty discounts.
214
  Take, for instance, Pharmacy Benefit Managers 
                                                          
213
 U.S. General Services Administration, Information for Federal Travelers, 
Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.gsa.gov/portal/content/103835. 
214
 A number of the recent loyalty discount cases have occurred in the medical 
devices industry, where large GPOs, representing large aggregations of hospitals, 
pervasively bargain for market share and other loyalty discounts. Hovenkamp, 
Antitrust and the Costs of Movement, supra n. xxx at 103.  GPOs are designed in 
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(“PBMs”) which have recently come under scrutiny for their 
contracting practices.
215
  PBMs manage the pharmacy benefits of 
group health plans sponsors such as HMOs, self-insured employees, 
indemnity plans, labor union plans, and public employee plans.
216
  
                                                                                                                                      
large part to solve collective action problems and leverage buyer power, John B. 
Kirkwood & Richard O. Zerbe, Jr., The Path to Profitability:  Reinvigorating the 
Neglected Phase of Merger Analysis, 17 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 39, 94 (2009) 
(discussing how retail pharmacies have solved collective action problems by 
forming group purchasing organizations).  Hence might provide a counter-story to 
the claim that buyer collective action problems undermine the evidence that buyers 
solicit loyalty discounts.    However, GPOs have come under criticism for failing to 
serve the interests of their member hospitals, S. PRAKASH SETHI, GROUP 
PURCHASING ORGANIZATIONS:  AN UNDISCLOSED SCANDAL IN THE U.S. 
HEALTHCARE INDUSTRY (2009); Einer Elhauge, The Exclusion of Competition for 
Hospital Sales Through Group Purchasing Organizations (June 25, 2002), 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/elhauge/pdf/gpo_report_june_02.pdf..  But see 
Herbert Hovenkamp, Group Purchasing Organization (GPO) Purchasing 
Agreements and Antitrust Law (January 2004), http://higpa.site-
ym.com/resource/resmgr/press_releases_2004/2004hovenkampgposandantitrus.pdf 
(arguing that GPO arrangements can lower prices and provide procompetitive 
benefits); Department of Justice & Federal Trade Commission, Improving Health 
Care:  A Dose of Competition (July 2004) 
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/healthcare/040723healthcarerpt.pdf (Chapter 4) 
(considering both procompetitive and potentially anticompetitive aspects of GPO 
agreements), so this example would require a longer exploration. 
215
 Elhauge has extended his criticisms of GPOs to PBMs, arguing that “[t]he 
largest PBM has a smaller market share than the largest GPO and thus would 
externalize even more of the market harm that would be caused if it agreed to an 
anticompetitive loyalty agreement” Elhauge, Failed Resurrection, supra n. xxx at 
184.  Elhauge’s comments have been overtaken by subsequent events.  Following 
the Express-Scripts/MedCo merger, the combined company had a market share 
over 40% and was effectively in a duopoly situation with CVS Caremark.  Daniel 
Weiss, FTC Approves Express Scripts-Medco Merger, Pharmacy Times (April 3, 
2012), http://www.pharmacytimes.com/news/FTC-Approves-Express-Scripts-
Medco-Merger. 
216
 See United States General Accounting Office, Report to the Hon. Byron L. 
Dorgan, U.S. Senate, Federal Employees’ Health Benefits:  Effects of Using 
Pharmacy Benefit Managers on Health Plans, Enrollees, and Pharmacies (January 
2003), http://www.gao.gov/assets/240/236828.pdf; Department of Justice & 
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Ninety-five percent of patients with prescription drug coverage 
receive their benefits through a PBM.
217
  PBMs play several roles on 
behalf of plans.  They determine what drugs should be on the plan 
formulary and negotiate with retailers for reimbursement rates when 
drugs on the formulary are dispensed at retail.
218
  PBMs also 
negotiate with drug manufacturers for discounts or rebates on brand 
name or generic drugs.
219
 
Market share discounts are a large part of the PBM’s strategy to 
drive down prices from drug manufacturers.  Both the FTC and GAO 
noted that manufacturer rebates were driven in large part by the 
PBM’s ability to increase the manufacturer’s market share.220  The 
FDA has noted that PBM rebates from manufacturers are predicated 
on the PBM “moving market share” to the manufacturer.221  Because 
a few large PBMs are effectively bargaining agents on behalf of tens 
of millions of patients, they exercise substantial leverage in these 
negotiations. 
Both the General Accounting Office and FTC have studied the 
effect of PBMs on drug prices and found them to lower prices.  For 
                                                                                                                                      
Federal Trade Commission, Improving Health Care:  A Dose of Competition (July 
2004), http://www.ftc.gov/reports/healthcare/040723healthcarerpt.pdf (Chapter 7). 
217
 FTC Report at 11. 
218
 Id. at 13-14. 
219
 Id. at 11. 
220
 GAO report at 11 (“Drug manufacturers provide  
PBMs certain rebates depending not only on inclusion of their drugs on a  
plan’s formulary but also on the PBMs’ ability to increase a manufacturer’s  
market share for certain drugs.”); FTC Report at 14 (“[T[he contract negotiated 
with the pharmaceutical manufacturer may provide a rebate off the fees owed by 
the PBM based on (a) a percentage of AWP or some other wholesale benchmark, 
(b) achieving certain specified sales or market share targets, (c) preferred 
placement of certain drug products on the PBMs’ formulary, or (d) a combination 
of items (a) - (c)”). 
221
 U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Regulatory Information, §2.2, 
http://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/Legislation/FederalFoodDrugandCosm
eticActFDCAct/SignificantAmendmentstotheFDCAct/PrescriptionDrugMarketing
Actof1987/ucm256484.htm; see also Lawrence W. Abrams, Pharmacy Benefit 
Managers as Bargaining Agents, http://www.nu-
retail.com/pbm_bargaining_paper.pdf (discussing PBMs’ use of market share 
discounts). 
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example, the GAO found that prices federal employees paid under 
PBM contracts was 18% the price paid by patients without third party 
coverage.
222
  The GAO attributed this in part to the manufacturer 
rebates.
223
 In a subsequent report to Congress, the FTC found that 
private-sector employers that offer prescription drug coverage pay 
less when using a mail-order pharmacy owned by a PBM, as opposed 
to using a mail-order or retail pharmacy that the PBM does not 
own.
224
 
Although PBMs have been criticized for not fully passing on their 
rebates and cost savings to plans or insureds, there is little question 
that PBMs have effectively reduced retail drug prices.  If anything, 
the primary criticism of PBMs is that they leverage too much buyer 
power on behalf of insurance companies, squeezing discounts, 
rebates, and other incentives out of retailers.
225
  As is well recognized 
in economic theory, cooperative buying arrangements can create 
monopsony power and thereby allow the purchasers to suppress 
prices below the competitive level.
226
 Tellingly, the National 
Association of Chain Drug Stores opposed the merger of two large 
PBMs, Express Scripts and Medco, apparently fearing that a 
powerful mega-PBM could squeeze prices even further.
227
  
Monopsonization or oligopsonization by group purchasing 
organizations may be an independent reason to fear loyalty discounts, 
but it is the opposite of the one at issue in virtually of the 
contemporary loyalty discounting cases.  What the PBM story quite 
                                                          
222
 GAO Report introduction. 
223
 GAO report at 9. 
224
 Pharmacy Benefit Managers:  Ownership of Mail-Order Pharmacies, FTC 
Report (August 2005), 
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/pharmbenefit05/050906pharmbenefitrpt.pdf. 
225
 GAO Report at introduction (Pharmacy associations report that the PBMs’ large 
market shares leave some retail pharmacies with little leverage in negotiating with 
PBMs.  Retail pharmacies must accept discounted reimbursements from PBMs 
they contract with and perform additional administrative tasks associated with 
claims processing.”). 
226
 ROGER D. BLAIR & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, MONOPSONY IN LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 106-22 (2010). 
227
 NACDS White Paper, The Proposed Merger of Express Scripts and Medco, 
(Oct. 2011, rev’d Feb. 2012), http://www.nacds.org/user-
assets/pdfs/2011/comm/nacds-white-paper_proposed-pbm-merger.PDF. 
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clearly shows is that coordinating buyers can use loyalty discounts to 
drive down prices.  
 Evidence of loyalty discounts sought by coordinating buyers 
does not mean that buyers never face collective action problems that 
dominant sellers exploit through offering loyalty discounts.  But the 
fact that buyers who can and do coordinate over large segments of 
the market erodes the claim that buyers would only accept loyalty 
discounts because of collective action problems. Some buyers may 
find themselves in the position of accepting loyalty discounts that 
they know injure buyers collectively, but that is far characteristic of 
loyal buyers as a whole.  
 
C.  The Value of Buyer-Seller Loyalty 
 
Having established that buyers at least sometimes seek loyalty 
discounts in order to drive down their prices, we come finally to the 
question of how loyalty discounts fit into broader issues of loyalty 
between seller and buyer.  For this, we turn to the management 
literature on loyalty in buyer-seller relations. 
A conventional model of business procurement holds that buyers 
should deliberately not exhibit loyalty—that they should seek to 
generate competition between rival sellers in order to obtain the 
lowest possible prices and the best terms of purchase.  Michael 
Porter, for example, argues that total procurement costs will be 
minimized by introducing and maintaining competition among 
suppliers, which can only be realized if the buyer procures from 
multiple sources.
228
 In Porter’s view, the threat of losing business to 
another supplier who already has an established relationship with the 
buyer incentivizes suppliers to deliver product quality at low cost.
229
 
By contrast, a wide business management literature stresses the 
benefits to buyers of entering into long-term monogamous or semi-
monogamous relationships with suppliers—of pursuing loyal 
relationships.
230
  Among the frequently cited benefits of buyer-seller 
                                                          
228
 MICHAEL PORTER, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE (1985); see also Richard G. 
Newman, Single Sourcing: Short-Term Savings Versus Long-Term Problems, 25 J. 
SUPPLY CHAIN MGMT. 20 (1989) (discussing short-term benefits of sole-source 
contracting but observing that in the long run there can be negative effects, such as 
reduced innovation and source dependency). 
229
 Porter, supra n. xxx. 
230
 See C. Jay Lambe, C. Michael Wittman & Robert E. Spekman, Social Exchange 
Theory and Research on Business-to-Business Relational Exchange, 8 J. BUS.-TO-
BUS. MKTG. 1 (2001); Michael R. Leenders, Jean Nollet & Lisa M. Ellram, 
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loyalty is trust-building.
231
  A long-term loyal relationship decreases 
the likelihood of seller opportunism.
232
  The procurement literature 
also stresses a number of other benefits to buyers of concentrating 
purchases on a small number of sellers.  Among these are minimizing 
search and transaction costs,
233
 driving down acquisition costs 
through the leverage of buying power, avoiding supply chain 
disruptions,
234
 achieving economies of scope or scale,
235
 and 
                                                                                                                                      
Adapting Purchasing to Supply Chain Management, 24 INT’L J. PHYSICAL 
DISTRIBUTION & LOGISTICS MGMT. 40 (1994); W. Deming, Out of the Crisis, MIT 
Center for Advanced Engineering Study (1986); F. Robert Dwyer, Paul H. Schurr 
& Sejo Oh, Developing Buyer-Seller Relationships, 51 J. MKTG. 11 (1987); Achim 
Walter, Thilo A. Mueller & Gabriele Helfert, The Impact of Satisfaction, Trust, and 
Relationship Value on Commitment: Theoretical Considerations and Empirical 
Results, Industrial Marketing and Purchasing Group Conference Proceedings 
(2000), available at http://www.impgroup.org/uploads/papers/131.pdf; Michael J. 
Dorsch, Scott R. Swanson & Scott W. Kelley, The Role of Relationship Quality in 
the Stratification of Vendors as Perceived by Customers, 26 J. ACAD. MKTG. SCI. 
128 (1998). 
231
 Lambe, supra n. xxx at 10-11, 21-22 (explaining how “trust [] enables firms to 
become committed and look past short-term opportunities for the long-term 
benefits available from the relationship”); Leeders, supra n. xxx at 23 (“Exchange 
participants begin to expect that their partners will participate in cooperative 
behaviors that benefit the firms. As these cooperative behaviors become common, 
expected and acceptable either implicitly or explicitly, cooperation becomes a 
norm.”);  
232
 Hawkins, supra n. xxx at xxx (noting that for-profit firms “frequently rely upon 
the expected long-term duration of the relationship between a buyer and supplier to 
decrease opportunism”). 
233
 Wedad J. Elmaghraby, Supply Contract Competition and Sourcing Policies, 2 
MFG. & SERV. OPERATIONS MGMT. 350, 351 (2000)  (“By pouring time and energy 
into establishing one strong and lasting relationship, a buyer is able to cut down on 
costs by avoiding downtime, rework, and excessive administration and increase 
quality by establishing a relationship that is responsive to the buyer’s needs and 
demands.”); 
234
 Eggert, supra n. xxx at 154 (“The advantages of working with fewer suppliers 
are well documented in the purchasing and supply chain management literature. 
From a cost perspective, placing a great emphasis on fewer suppliers allows a 
customer to concentrate order volumes and gain more influence over vendors.”); 
Elmaghraby, supra n. xxx at 351 (“[B]uyers who employ a single sourcing strategy 
feel that the chance of a supply disruption is reduced when a buyer develops a 
strong relationship with a single supplier.”); Mark Treleven & Sharon Bergman 
Schweikhart, A Risk/Benefit Analysis of Sourcing Strategies: Single vs. Multiple 
Sourcing, 7 OPERATIONS MGMT. 93 (1988) (“[B]buyers who employ a single 
sourcing strategy feel that the chance of a supply disruption is reduced when a 
buyer develops a strong relationship with a single supplier.”). 
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contributing to product quality improvement by securing the seller’s 
attention to the buyer’s needs.236 
All of this sounds good for buyer loyalty, but raises a question 
about loyalty discounts:  If loyalty is so valuable to buyers, then why 
do sellers have to pay them to stay loyal?  If buyers gain so much by 
staying loyal to a single seller, then why wouldn’t we observe buyers 
seeking exclusive or semi-exclusive relationships with suppliers 
without the need for any inducement by the seller? 
There is an easy answer and a harder one.  The easy answer is 
that one of the benefits to buyers identified in the procurement 
literature is price reductions.
237
  In other words, part of the gains to 
buyers from loyal relationships comes from the fact that their loyalty 
allows them to obtain lower prices from sellers. 
The harder answer has to do with the fact that loyal buyer-seller 
relationships can simultaneously benefit both buyers and sellers.
238
  
Some of their gains from loyalty—such as transaction cost reduction, 
achieving scale economies, or enhancing business planning—may be 
joint.  In that case, the seller and buyer’s relative bargaining positions  
determine how they allocate their mutual gains between themselves.  
Other aspects of a customer’s loyalty may benefit one party at the 
expense of the other, or may provide the parties asymmetric benefits 
and costs.  If a loyalty commitment elasticizes the buyer’s demand 
                                                                                                                                      
235
 Elmaghraby, supra n. xxx at 351 (“In addition, buyers feel that they receive the 
best price from their single supplier because of the economies of scale achieved 
from being awarded all of the buyer’s business.”); Manohar U. Kalwani & 
Narakersari Narayandas, Long-Term Manufacturer Relationships: Do They Pay Off 
for Supplier Firms?, 59 J. MKTG. 1 (1995) (“From a customer’s point of view, 
supplier relationships should be built in order to achieve increased cost efficiency, 
increased effectiveness, enabling technologies and increased competitiveness.”). 
236
 Eggert, supra n. xxx at 154 (explaining how loyal buyers can induce sellers to 
pay greater attention to their needs and contribute to lowering production costs and 
influence product innovation). 
237
 Supra n. xxx. 
238
Amy Zhaohui Zeng, A Synthetic Study of Sourcing Strategies, 100 INDUSTRIAL 
MANAGEMENT & DATA SYSTEMS 219 (2000) (“It can be noticed that the 
overlapped benefits for both buyer and supplier are revealed in cost reduction, 
improved communication, flexibility, and stability.”); F. Robert Dwyer, Paul H. 
Schurr & Sejo Oh, Developing Buyer-Seller Relationships, 51 J. MKTG. 11 (1987) 
(discussing possibility of possibility of “significant gains in joint-and consequently 
individual-payoffs  as a result of  effective communication and collaboration to 
attain goals.”). 
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and thereby enhances its ability to demand a lower price, the seller 
loses.
239
 
Loyalty is a bargaining chip with varied consequences for sellers 
and buyers.  Without examining the circumstance facing the parties 
in a particular case, it is impossible to determine how the chips will 
land for each side.  It is clear, however, that loyalty is an important 
part of the bargain in many cases and has the potential to increase the 
welfare of buyers, sellers, or both.  An antitrust policy that 
discouraged or restricted the use of loyalty provisions could reduce 
buyer welfare and social welfare overall. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Loyalty incentives can be exclusionary if they prevent the seller’s 
rivals from competing for loyal customer business and foreclose so 
                                                          
239
 See Klein & Murphy, supra n. xxx.  Elhauge has argued that the Klein-Murphy 
model of demand elasticization through loyalty commitments is implausible 
because, if it were true, sellers with market power would avoid contracts with 
loyalty provisions.  Elhauge, Failed Resurrection, supra n. xxx at 185 (“Under [the 
Klein-Murphy] model, the two sellers in a differentiated market would sell at cost 
and earn zero profits if they used exclusive contracts, but would sell at prices that 
were double their cost if they did not. Given that premise, it is hard to see why the 
sellers would be willing to bid on an exclusive basis, let alone why, as Klein and 
Murphy assert, sellers would have “the exact same motivation” as retailers to 
initiate exclusive bidding. Under their model, exclusive contracts harm the sellers 
and thus any seller with market power would avoid them.”).  But that argument 
ignores the multifaceted nature of the benefits and costs to both sellers and buyers 
of loyalty inducements.  Sellers may obtain other benefits from loyalty 
commitments—such as expanding their market share, leveraging fixed costs over 
more dollars of revenue, achieving scale economies, and optimizing planning—that 
offset any losses from facing a more elastic demand curve.  Further, Elhauge’s 
argument begins with the assumption that loyalty discounts are always seller-driven 
strategies, or that sellers have the power to resist them.  In fact, as noted, buyers are 
often the instigators.  Sellers would obviously like buyer loyalty without awarding 
discounts, but faced with a buyer demand for a discount in exchange for loyalty, 
they may not have the power to say no, particularly if the buyer has decided to 
award the bulk of its purchases to a single seller and a refusal to entertain a demand 
for loyalty discount means losing the bulk of the customer’s business.  Sellers 
bargain for loyalty and buyers bargain for discounts; loyalty discounts are the 
marriage of these countervailing pressures. 
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much of the relevant market that the rivals are unable to compete.  
But that usually is not the case.  To the contrary, loyalty discounts are 
often granted in robustly competitive markets and have no 
exclusionary effects.  They bring lower prices to customers willing to 
forgo their variety preferences and consolidate a majority of their 
purchases in a single supplier.   
This Article has not proposed a comprehensive legal or economic 
framework within which to assess loyalty incentives.  Rather, it has 
suggested that, as a starting point, courts and antitrust agencies think 
about loyalty discounts as true discounts—as price reductions below 
the price the buyer would have to pay if it decided not to behave 
loyally. As such, loyalty discounts belong squarely within antitrust’s 
hospitability tradition for unilateral, non-predatory price discounts, 
even those that cause discomfiture to competitors. 
Loyalty is considered a virtue in most areas of law.  Antitrust 
should be no exception. 
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